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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Uncontrolled Enrollment Expansion:  
Fragmented Authoritarianism in Chinese Higher Education 
 
 
The enrollment expansion of the Chinese higher education has no historical 
precedent, and defies belief in its speed and scale. I argue that this rapid enrollment 
growth is best understood not as a natural phenomenon of the market economy, nor as an 
intentional policy outcome, but rather as a byproduct of the structure of the Chinese state. 
I propose that the central government’s lack of effective control over lower-level cadres 
at local governments and individual universities was instrumental in the expansion of 
enrollments far beyond the intentions of the Ministry of Education. This uncontrolled 
enrollment expansion was enabled by local officials’ soft budget constraints, and 
incentivized by their short time horizons and focus on superficial “hard targets.” When 
the MOE attempted to rein in the expansion rate at all levels starting in 2002, only elite, 
directly-administered universities slowed their growth. At locally-administered 
universities, meanwhile, central policy was severely distorted by the effects of 
decentralization and fragmented authoritarianism. Furthermore, I provide evidence that 
only by reinforcing its monitoring capability at lower levels was the central government 
able to reassert its authority. 
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UNCONTROLLED ENROLLMENT EXPANSION: 
FRAGMENTED AUTHORITARIANISM IN CHINESE HIGHER EDUCATION 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Over the past sixty years, the history of China’s higher education has been almost 
as tumultuous as that of the country itself. The university system had an uneasy 
relationship with Maoist ideology from 1949 to the late 1970s, culminating in the closure 
of most universities during the early stages of the Cultural Revolution.1 When Maoism 
gave way to Deng Xiaoping’s market reforms, rebuilding higher education became a key 
policy objective.2  For most of the reform era, bureaucrats focused on improving 
education quality while maintaining moderate enrollment growth. Throughout all of 1978 
to 1998, annual university recruitments increased from 0.86 to 1.08 million, a yearly 
average of 1.13%.3  
Yet another upheaval of the Chinese university system took place starting in 
1999, with the surprise announcement of a rapid enrollment expansion policy. The 
subsequent decade was a period of unprecedented enrollment growth. Today the Chinese 
higher education system has nearly eight times the number of students it did in 1998.4 
Such massive enrollment expansion has no historical precedent, and defies belief in its 
                                                
1 Hu Shi and Eli Seifman, eds., Education and Socialist Modernization: A Documentary History of 
Education in the People’s Republic of China, 1977-1986 (New York: AMS Press, 1987), 31. 
2 Suzanne Pepper, China’s Education Reform in the 1980s: Policies, Issues, and Historical Perspectives 
(Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, UC Berkeley, 1990), 128-161. 
3 Bai Limin, “Graduate Unemployment: Dilemmas and Challenges in China’s Move to Mass Higher 
Education.” The China Quarterly 185 (2006). 130. 
4 Zha Qiang, “Understanding China’s move to mass higher education from a policy perspective,” in 
Portraits of 21st Century Chinese Universities: In the Move to Mass Higher Education, edited by Ruth 
Hayhoe, Jun Li, Jing Lin and Qiang Zha (Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Center, 2011), 32. 
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speed and scale. Examining the origins of this rapid enrollment growth, this thesis argues 
that it is best understood not as a natural phenomenon of the market economy, nor as an 
intentional policy outcome, but rather as a byproduct of the structure of the Chinese 
state—namely, its increasing decentralization and fragmentation. 
While enrollment expansion in 1999 was officially explained as an investment in 
human resources and a way to make China more internationally competitive, this was not 
the most basic source of the proposal. Wang Qinghua and other researchers have 
investigated the policy’s background in the internal politics of the Chinese Communist 
Party, writing that a more direct impetus for the decision was the looming Asian 
Financial Crisis.5 Although the crisis started in 1997, it was slowly spreading throughout 
the region and threatened to reach China next—indeed, although China was less hard-hit 
than some of its neighbors, its GDP growth rate fell from 9.6% in 1998 to only 7.8% in 
1999.6 In anticipation of this looming financial crisis, the government sought to stimulate 
domestic consumption in order to decrease reliance on the faltering export market. At the 
same time, China also implemented reforms privatizing many of its state-owned 
enterprises; this led to high levels of unemployment, provoking the fear of social unrest.7 
Against this backdrop, Asian Development Bank economist Tang Min submitted 
an open letter to top Party leaders, calling for a radical increase in university enrollment 
as a cost-effective way of both decreasing unemployment and stimulating domestic 
consumption. Published in the Chinese periodical Jingjixue Xiaoxibao (Economic 
                                                
5 Wang Qinghua, “Crisis Management, Regime Survival and 'Guerrilla-Style' Policy-Making: The June 
1999 Decision to Radically Expand Higher Education in China.” The China Journal, no. 71 (2014): 132-
152; see also Min Weifang and Wen Dongmao, Xueshu de liliang: Jiaoyu yanjiu yu zhengce zhiding (The 
Power of Scholarship: Educational Research and Policy-Making) (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2010), 
Chapter 4 
6 Min and Wen (2010) 
7 Ibid. 
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Highlights) in February 1999, his proposal concentrated on preserving stable economic 
growth in the face of the looming Asian Financial Crisis.8  
In his article, Tang Min recommended that the government double university 
enrollments over the following three to four years, increasing from 2 million to 4 million 
students. Furthermore, these new students were to be fully self-funded, with their annual 
tuition raised to 10,000 RMB—about 4-6 times the 1998 cost.9 Tang Min estimated that 
doubling university enrollment could stimulate roughly 100 billion RMB (17.2 billion 
USD) through increased tuition, in-school spending, and consumption in related sectors. 
Together, these effects could add half a percentage point to China’s GDP. Enrollment 
expansion would also temporarily alleviate employment pressure by delaying high school 
graduates from entering the job market, thus reducing unemployment by as much as one 
third. Keeping unemployment under control, at least for the time being, would be 
especially important to mitigate the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis.10 
While Tang Min’s article explicitly warned against hasty, unprepared, or 
disconcerted policy action,11 the CCP leadership did not take heed of this caveat. As 
Wang Qinghua describes, top Party leaders pushed the policy through with alarming 
rapidity, showing little consideration for the opinions of the Ministry of Education 
(MOE) or experts in the education field.12 Ji Baocheng, chief of MOE’s Department of 
Development and Planning, put together a research team at Peking University to 
investigate the proposal’s feasibility and economic efficacy. The policy process was so 
                                                
8 Tang Min and Zuo Xiaolei, “Kuoda gaoxiao zhaosheng liang yi bei: guanyu qidong zhongguo jingji 
youxiao tujing de sixiang” (Recommendation to double the size of higher education enrollment: Thoughts 
on an effective way to stimulate the Chinese economy). Jingjixue Xiaoxibao, February 1999.  
9 Zhu, Jian. “Gaoxiao kuozhao heyi shishi: Jiyu ‘ziyuan xishi moxing’ de jieshi” (How higher education 
expansion was implemented: An explanation based on the ‘resource dilution model’). Zhongguo Gaozhi 
Gaozhuan Jiaoyu Wang (2011). 
10 Tang Min, “Kuoda gaoxiao zhaosheng liang yi bei” 
11 Ibid. 
12 Wang Qinghua, “Crisis Management, Regime Survival and 'Guerrilla-Style' Policy-Making” 
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rushed, however, that by the time this research team completed its report in early June, 
top CCP leaders had already made their decision. Not even Chen Zhili, Minister of 
Education, was able to conduct the intended feasibility studies in time.13 
As a direct intervention by the top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, 
university enrollment expansion represented a significant challenge to the MOE’s 
authority over education policy. The MOE continuously opposed the new policy until its 
official announcement in late June 1999. Wang Qinghua frames the 1999 decision in 
terms of crisis management on the part of the regime, reporting that over the course of the 
policy process for university expansion, top CCP leaders “ignored opposition from the 
MOE, overturned established policies and assumed de facto control over MOE 
bureaucratic power.”14 The main goal of this policy intervention was to avoid economic 
disaster; as far as top leaders were concerned, “the side effects on higher education were 
of secondary importance when the Party … rule was threatened.”15 
Although the MOE was obligated to take the Party line and even publicly 
affirmed the decision, internally, its attitude toward the rapid expansion policy remains 
unclear. With Chinese universities already struggling financially, putting even more 
stress on the higher education system’s limited material and human resources was not an 
appealing prospect. Compelled to enact rapid enrollment expansion against its better 
judgment, the MOE would presumably wish to expand as little as possible while still 
meeting the demands of the Party leadership—and yet, despite the undesirability and 
massive scale of Tang Min’s proposal, it actually fell short of reality. Rather than 
requiring four years to double in size, recruitments more than doubled in only two years; 
                                                
13 Ibid., 150. 
14 Ibid., 134. 
15 Ibid., 151. 
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not only was the initial surge of enrollments much greater than Tang Min recommended, 
university growth also continued well into the following decade. 
Figure 1.1 
 
 
This explosion of higher education, shown in Figure 1.1, has had ripple effects 
throughout Chinese society, with many regarding it as a response to long-held concerns 
about the inequality and inadequacy of the Chinese university system. Despite its own 
misgivings, MOE has often publicly boasted about the extraordinary growth, such as in 
2008, when China’s university student body became the largest in the world in absolute 
numbers.16 Notwithstanding these achievements, enrollment expansion has had a darker 
side. Its social and economic repercussions are frequent topics of both popular and 
academic discussion. The well-known author Yu Hua compared the enrollment campaign 
to the Great Leap Forward—a rash and irresponsible endeavor, with many potential 
                                                
16 Zha Qiang, “Understanding China’s move to mass higher education,” 27. 
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crises lurking behind the “glorious statistics” of expansion numbers.17 Chief among these 
is the unemployment of college graduates, which has soared in recent years as the job 
market has become increasingly saturated with degree-holders.18 
The continued rapid expansion of Chinese university enrollments far into the 
2000s has had a number of harmful effects not just in the job market, but also within the 
education system itself. Many of the worst problems in Chinese higher education today 
are a direct result of this extended period of massive enrollment expansion. Perhaps most 
dangerous for universities’ long-term sustainability is the huge debt they have taken on in 
order to pay for expansion, which Yu Hua placed at around 200 billion RMB.19 
Academic Cao Shujiang arrived at the even more alarming estimate of 458 billion RMB, 
an amount which, even if enrollment growth stopped completely, would still take 
universities over seventeen years to pay back in full.20 Besides institutional debt, the 
increased size of the student body has also put a severe strain on educational resources, 
undoing years of MOE work focusing on education quality. Furthermore, despite the 
growth in the total number of university students, Chinese higher education retains a high 
degree of elitism and inequality. Top-tier universities remain small and selective, leading 
to severe competition and test-oriented teaching in primary and secondary education. 
Significant inequality also exists along regional, urban/rural, gender, and ethnic lines.21 
Scholars such as Ruth Hayhoe have made considerable progress researching the 
evolution of the higher education system since rapid enrollment expansion began. The 
                                                
17 Yu Hua, China in Ten Words, trans. Allan H. Barr (New York: Anchor Books, 2011), 119. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Cao Shujiang, “Woguo putong gaoxiao zhaiwu wenti yanjiu” (A study on the debt issue of regular 
institutions of higher education in China). Gaodeng Jiaoyu Yanjiu 17, no. 2 (2012): 63-67. 
21 W. James Jacob, “Social justice in Chinese higher education: Regional issues of equity and access.” 
Review of Education 52 (2006):149-169. 
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final chapter of her edited volume describes a trend in which the state retains and 
reinforces control of “knowledge production,” while management is allowed to 
decentralize.22 While Hayhoe and her co-authors give a great deal of attention to the 
former phenomenon, they do not deeply discuss the implications of the latter, concurrent 
trend of administrative decentralization. Rather, their research is chiefly concerned with 
the identification of “an emerging Chinese model of the university” based upon the 
country’s long cultural tradition of scholarship and learning.23 They carry out extensive 
research of a number of well-known Chinese universities, providing a holistic social, 
cultural, and administrative history for each one; they intentionally limit their study to 
prestigious “key” universities, even though the vast majority of enrollment expansion 
took place in lower-tier undergraduate and technical insitutions. Although enrollment 
expansion forms the most basic context for the work of Hayhoe et al., its deeper causes 
are only briefly examined in one chapter. This focus on the effects of expansion rather 
than its causes is typical of the academic literature. 
This gap could be due to the lack of documentation and general difficulty of 
researching the internal workings of the Chinese state. Short of engaging in time-
intensive field work projects, in general the only resources available are those provided 
by the Chinese government itself. China’s statistical self-reporting is not known for its 
accuracy; the public documentation of its policies and procedures is far from complete. 
Enrollment expansion continued well beyond what would have been thought possible in 
1999, but few if any scholarly works make it a primary aim to formulate a convincing 
account of exactly what was happening during this protracted period. This thesis 
                                                
22 Ruth Hayhoe et al., Portraits of 21st Century Chinese Universities: In the Move to Mass Higher 
Education (Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Center, 2011), 462. 
23 Ruth Hayhoe and Yan Fengqiao, “China’s Universities in the Move to Mass Higher Education: The 
Search for Equality, Quality and Diversity.” Frontiers of Education in China 5, no. 4 (2010): 469. 
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undertakes the task of making just such an account, but rather than attempting to find a 
single conclusive explanation for enrollment expansion, I make use of clues and indirect 
evidence in the sources that are publicly available, following the structure of a process of 
elimination to examine three candidate theories.  
Confronted with the astronomical growth seen in Figure 1.1, one potential 
explanation is that Tang Min’s proposal led to the discovery of a massive untapped 
market for higher education. Although there is good reason to believe that market forces 
of supply and demand play an increasingly important role in the Chinese university 
system, I demonstrate in Chapter 2 that macroeconomic influences alone are not 
sufficient to explain rapid enrollment expansion. Another possible explanation may be 
that the MOE had a change of heart, and once the decision was made, leaders of the 
education bureaucracy put their full efforts into the project of university expansion. In 
Chapter 3, however, I present evidence that in fact the opposite is true: for most of the 
2000s, the MOE actively tried to restrict enrollment growth, to no avail.  
If expansion was caused neither by macroeconomic factors nor by central 
planning, then how did it happen? In Chapter 4, I discuss the “fragmented 
authoritarianism” that has resulted from China’s political, bureaucratic, and fiscal 
decentralization, as described in a large body of academic literature. Seldom has this 
analytical framework been used to study to China’s university system in particular; 
although Chinese scholars have applied relevant concepts to the university debt crisis, 
none go so far as to say that expansion itself was a result of such factors. Drawing on this 
literature for theoretical support, and using official government data and MOE policy 
papers as primary evidence, Chapter 5 proposes that the lion’s share of Chinese higher 
education expansion resulted from the central government’s lack of effective control over 
lower-level cadres at local governments and individual universities. I argue that the 
  9 
MOE’s basic lack of control over local cadres played a decisive role in the rapid 
enrollment expansion of Chinese universities, a role that can only be understood in the 
context of fragmented authoritarianism. 
  10 
CHAPTER 2 
TESTING ECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON ENROLLMENT GROWTH 
2.1—Competing Explanations: Market Economy or State Planning? 
The Chinese government’s June 1999 announcement of the plan to increase 
enrollment by 44% from the previous year was a major departure from higher education 
policy throughout the 1980s and 1990s.1 The Ministry of Education’s decades-long 
effort to build up the quality of the university system was seemingly set aside overnight 
in favor of the new focus on expanding enrollment numbers. Enrollment expansion on the 
scale of Tang Min’s proposal would be a tremendous undertaking, considered by some 
experts to be logistically impossible.2 And yet, as described in Chapter 1, the ambitious 
goal set out in Tang Min’s proposal—to double university enrollments in two to three 
years—was not only achieved, it was exceeded significantly. By 2008, China had the 
largest university student body in the world in absolute numbers, at 29 million students; 
today the Chinese higher education system has nearly eight times the number of students 
it did in 1998.3  
Initial attempts to explain this rapid enrollment expansion might fall into one of 
two camps. Either universities grew in response to high economic demand from Chinese 
society; or enrollment expansion was an intentional policy outcome coordinated by the 
MOE. The dichotomy between market economics and central planning is one that 
appears often in the Chinese context, and both explanations have their merits. In the next 
two chapters, however, I provide evidence challenging both of these hypotheses one at a 
                                                
1 Zha, “Understanding China’s move to mass higher education,” 27. 
2 Wang Qinghua, “Crisis Management, Regime Survival and 'Guerrilla-Style' Policy-Making,” 148. 
3 Zha, 32. 
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time. Eliminating these two competing views is necessary before moving on to a more 
novel explanation based upon decentralization and fragmented authoritarianism. 
The hypothesis that universities expanded enrollments in response to economic 
demand from the Chinese people appears to be a promising one, fitting nicely with Tang 
Min’s proposal. His article contended that there was a huge untapped market for higher 
education in Chinese society as a result of its Confucian heritage, the one-child policy, 
and increasing competition in the job market. Indeed, one of Tang Min’s main arguments 
had been that improving access to universities would be one of the few effective ways to 
entice frugal Chinese consumers to withdraw their savings and spend it on the economy. 
Education being in such high demand among Chinese parents, Tang Min maintained that 
the majority of the Chinese population would be both willing and able to undertake the 
total cost of a university education.4 As discussed in this chapter, this explanation is lent 
additional credence by Chinese higher education’s market reforms, which meant that 
increasing enrollments was one of the primary ways of increasing revenue. A main 
problem with the market-economy argument, however, is the fact that Chinese 
universities undertook such large debt over the course of expansion, which would be 
difficult to explain if increasing enrollments were indeed a profitable economic activity. 
A linear regression analysis is used to test enrollment expansion’s relationship with 
macroeconomic factors, finding no statistically significant correlation. 
2.2—Market Reforms of Chinese Higher Education 
In the years leading up to enrollment expansion, a number of higher education 
reforms were implemented as part of China’s transition to a more market-based economy. 
One such market reform was the phasing out of the job allocation system (fenpei zhidu). 
                                                
4 Tang Min, “Kuoda gaoxiao zhaosheng liang yi bei” 
  12 
Under the planned economy, college students received the rank of government cadres 
upon graduation, and were automatically assigned employment by the state. Once 
economic liberalization began in earnest in the 1980s, however, an open job market 
emerged alongside the previous assignment system. By the 1990s, the fenpei system had 
become redundant, and higher education was now an individual investment rather than 
the state’s personnel training ground.5 
Beginning in the early 1990s, the government also began allowing Chinese 
universities to charge tuition and fees. Starting in 1997, all universities were required to 
charge tuition. 6  This “user-pays” policy was integral to the university system’s 
adaptation to the new market economy. The cost of tuition varied dramatically by 
location, university, and field of study; in general, variation in regional tuition cost 
reflected local economic conditions, but this was not always the case. Zhao and Rong 
provide statistics showing a typical yearly increase in nationwide average tuition of 
around 15-20% from 1993 to 2004. Interestingly, the sharpest rise was in 1999, when 
average tuition increased 40.4% from 1,974 RMB to 2,769 RMB.7 By 2007, average 
tuition had reached 5,986 RMB, which exceeded one third of the GDP per capita in all 
but the wealthiest provinces. According to a 2004 article, “out of control” universities 
regularly exceeded tuition guidelines set by the central government—so that the cost of a 
typical university education was rising much faster than China’s average annual income.8  
                                                
5 Zha, 46. 
6 Ibid., 47. 
7 Zhao Juhui and Rong Shulong, “Woguo gaodeng xuexiao xuefei biaozhun yu jumin shouru shuiping, 
GDP de zengzhang fenxi” (An analysis of the relationship between tuition fees in higher education and the 
income of residents or the increase of GDP per person in China). Liaoning Normal University Social 
Science Journal 31, no. 3 (2008): 59-61. 
8 Zhang Yan, “Daxue xuefei zengzhang ji gao, zhangfu shibeiyu jumin shouru zengzhang” (University 
tuition rising with abnormal speed, 10 times faster than average income). Chutian Dushi Bao (Wuhan), 
September 8, 2004.  
  13 
Although universities were encouraged to diversify their sources of revenue by 
seeking more support from society and taking on profit-making activities, in reality, the 
accompanying decline in government investment only forced universities to charge 
higher tuition and fees—and when this income was not sufficient, to accrue heavy debt.9 
Chinese scholar Cao Shujiang estimated the combined debt of all Chinese universities to 
be 458 billion RMB in 2009, an amount that would require seventeen years to repay even 
if enrollments stayed the same. He ascribed primary responsibility for this debt to the 
launch of enrollment expansion in 1999 and the accompanying wave of construction 
projects needed to accommodate the new students.10 
The marketization of the Chinese university system might seem to indicate that 
individual universities expanded enrollments because it was in their own economic self-
interest. This hypothesis is strengthened by the fact that government funding to individual 
universities, another main income source, was also allocated based upon enrollment 
size.11 Adding additional students thus meant not only more income from tuition and 
fees, but also more financial support from the government. On the other hand, the 
immense size of universities’ institutional debt suggests that not only was enrollment 
expansion not profitable, it was extremely expensive to accommodate the new students. 
Enrollment expansion being costly to individual universities would mean that rather than 
a means of generating revenue, it should be regarded as a government policy to be 
implemented, despite the cost. 
This question is crucial to the validity of the market hypothesis—if it were 
profitable to do so, Chinese higher education would expand to match demand, 
                                                
9 Ding Xiaohao et al., “Thirty years of reforming China’s higher education funding mechanism,” in Higher 
Education Reform in China: Beyond the Expansion, edited by W. John Morgan and Bin Wu (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 86, 89. 
10 Cao Shujiang, “Woguo putong gaoxiao zhaiwu wenti yanjiu,” 65. 
11 Zha, 47. 
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particularly where existing infrastructure made such expansion more affordable. This 
market-regulated expansion would not necessarily be the case, however, if the cost of 
expansion exceeded the additional revenue to be gained. In the next section, I use linear 
regression analysis to test university enrollment expansion’s relationship with several 
economic factors. My findings reveal no significant correlation, suggesting that there 
were other forces at work than supply and demand. 
2.3—Explanation of Statistical Models 
Before running the regression analysis, this section first outlines three candidate 
models as to how economic factors played into expansion. These three hypotheses 
include economic demand, institutional capacity, and financial incentive; the 
explanations are not contradictory and the models could conceivably all have an element 
of truth. As described in the regression results, however, the data reveals that even 
together, the three models are insufficient to explain either the rapid growth rate of higher 
education enrollment or its peculiar pattern.  
Most of the data for this analysis comes from China’s National Bureau of 
Statistics, with additional information from the Education Finance Statistical Yearbooks 
on spending and revenue. For both of these sources, the unit of analysis is the province, 
which I have compiled in a panel data format. Although analysis on the level of 
individual institutions would also be of interest to this study, such information is not 
generally available—while some universities do publish yearly statistical yearbooks with 
relevant information, these tend to be higher-tier institutions, introducing a strong 
selection bias. An analysis of provincial-level data still allows the examination of trends 
in higher education, albeit only in broad geographic terms. 
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The first model to be tested is the hypothesis that higher education expansion 
occurred primarily where there was greater demand. “Fulfilling parents’ dreams for their 
children” and “meeting the ardent demand for higher education” are consistently listed as 
a leading justification for the expansion policy.12 If enrollment expansion followed 
simple market economy principles of supply and demand, it would have happened more 
in areas where there remained a lack of access to higher education despite relatively 
wealthy residents. To test this model, three explanatory variables can be used. The first, 
GDP per capita, measures the income level of each province. The other two measure 
higher education access by looking at universities per head of population and college 
students per head of population. The hypothesis for this model predicts that enrollment 
expansion ought to have a positive correlation with GDP per capita, but a negative 
correlation with measures of access to higher education. 
Table 2.1 
 
 
The second hypothesis is that expansion rate depended upon the capacity of 
existing higher education infrastructure. In areas where higher education was more 
developed and better supported, schools had greater ability to expand enrollments due to 
being more institutionally prepared and having more resources. This institutional capacity 
can be measured by looking at three explanatory variables: higher education spending per 
student, number of teachers per student, and the proportion of universities belonging to 
                                                
12 Gaige kaifang 30 nian Zhongguo jiaoyu gaige yu fazhan keti zu (Research Team on China’s Educational 
Reform and Development in the Last Thirty Years), Jiaoyu daguo de jueqi 1978–2008 (The Rise of the 
Country through Education 1978–2008) (Beijing: Jiaoyu Kexue Chuban She, 2008), 191. 
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the better-funded elite university projects. According to the hypothesis, enrollment 
expansion should have a positive correlation with all of these variables. 
Table 2.2 
 
 
The third and final hypothesis is that schools were financially incentivized to 
increase their enrollments, with two factors contributing simultaneously. The first is that 
universities could gain more revenue by charging tuition and fees. If this were the case, 
the percentage of revenue coming from tuition and fees would presumably have a 
positive correlation with enrollment expansion. The other potential incentive is that by 
expanding enrollments, universities could also secure more government support than they 
would otherwise receive. The amount of government appropriations to universities—
which still makes up a large part of higher education funding in China—is determined 
primarily by enrollment size.13 This effect can be indirectly estimated by looking at the 
percentage increase in government funding. A positive correlation between increased 
funding and enrollment growth would be consistent with this hypothesis.  
Table 2.3 
 
 
For all of the models, the dependent variable is regular higher education 
institutions’ growth rate of new enrollments—in other words, the percentage increase 
                                                
13 Zha, “Understanding China’s move to mass higher education,” 47. 
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from last year in new students recruited this year. Although other measures of expansion 
would be possible, such as growth of the entire student body size, this measure is chosen 
because it is the most direct reflection of decisions being made by university 
administrators on a yearly basis. Since these decisions would be based on the previous 
year’s economic or financial situation, the explanatory variables are all lagged by one 
year—that is, last year’s input affects this year’s output. The exception is the percentage 
increase of government funding. It is assumed that university administrators would make 
a decision to expand enrollments in anticipation of a corresponding increase in 
allocations, as they have more information regarding how the state financial apparatus 
determines funding based on enrollment numbers. 
2.4—Regression Results and Analysis 
The relationship between enrollment growth rates and the eight explanatory 
variables listed above can be tested using multiple regression analysis in SPSS. Since the 
models are not mutually exclusive and could each be relevant, looking at all three in the 
same regression allows for the best possible predictive power. A preliminary correlation 
test revealed a statistically significant correlation between GDP per capita and university 
students per 10,000 people; to avoid multicollinearity, these two variables cannot both be 
included in the same calculation. Therefore, two separate regressions have been run. 
Provincial and yearly dummy variables were used to control for fixed effects. Table 2.4 
shows the results. A table of descriptive statistics for all the variables used may be found 
in Appendix 1. 
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Table 2.4 
 
 
Despite the plausibility of each of the candidate hypothetical models, the results 
show that even giving the p-value (significance) a generous threshold of 0.10, there is no 
statistically significant correlation between the explanatory variables and growth rate of 
new enrollments. In other words, the data fails to reject the null hypothesis that the listed 
variables had no demonstrable effect on enrollment expansion at the provincial level. 
These results lend support to the conclusion that despite the marketization of the Chinese 
higher education system, enrollment expansion was not profitable, and therefore was not 
strongly affected by supply and demand. 
It is true that the lack of significance could be the result of using provinces rather 
than individual universities as the unit of analysis. However, the hypotheses used to 
generate these models—especially the first two—seem to be of a nature that would affect 
not only single institutions, but also large geographic areas. GDP per capita, access to 
higher education, and development status of existing universities are all important 
characteristics of the macroeconomic environment. Similarly, while the financial 
incentive variables might affect individual institutions unequally, the lack of geographic 
correlation with expansion challenges this hypothesis as well. Simply put, if enrollment 
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expansion fit neatly into a macroeconomic framework based on geographic differences, 
one would expect to see evidence for such a relationship in the data. 
Even though Chinese higher education was becoming more marketized, drawing 
more of its revenue from extra-government funding sources such tuition and fees, 
enrollment expansion still seems to have been costly rather than profitable. Any 
additional revenue that universities could gain from increasing their enrollments was 
smaller than the cost of expansion; the amount of additional revenue seems to have had 
no bearing on the rate of enrollment growth. Enrollment expansion was not something 
universities were doing in order to make money, but rather a government policy to be 
implemented in spite of the cost. Thus, the regression analysis shows that in order to 
explain rapid enrollment expansion, it is necessary to look beyond market factors in the 
following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EVALUATING THE CENTRAL PLANNING HYPOTHESIS 
3.1—MOE: Central Authority in a Decentralized State 
As discussed in Chapter 2, while the pace of enrollment expansion far exceeded 
initial 1999 goals and continued expanding for several more years, this rapid growth 
cannot be explained as a natural phenomenon of the market economy. A plausible 
alternative is central planning, especially since China has a history of a planned economy 
and the government still plays an active role in many strategic sectors. This chapter 
evaluates the central planning hypothesis, finding it to be insufficient as well. Rather than 
being a product of central planning, Chinese university expansion can best be 
characterized as an uncontrolled phenomenon that the MOE was powerless to stop. 
In this chapter, I first look at how the MOE’s changing rhetoric in the aftermath of 
the 1999 policy announcement could give the impression that expansion was coordinated 
by the central government; I then describe how decentralization affected the university 
system, casting doubt on this impression. Official data reveals enrollment expansion’s 
haphazard and damaging effects, especially in terms of the increasing stratification of 
higher education. Finally, I compare MOE yearly enrollment targets with actual 
recruiting numbers over the period from 1999 to 2007. Together, this information is 
strong evidence that rather than planning or coordinating enrollment expansion 
nationwide, the Ministry of Education was actually trying to slow it down, in part in 
order to counter stratification and salvage the quality of higher education. 
Chapter 1 showed that the MOE was initially opposed to top Party leaders 
imposing the enrollment expansion for their own reasons. Despite being sidelined in this 
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manner, however, the MOE kept such internal frictions out of the public view, yielding to 
the Party’s leadership and presenting a united front once it became clear that the decision 
was final. When announcing the expansion policy, the MOE preferred to explain it in 
terms that were more palatable to the public than Tang Min’s proposal, which was 
essentially to use higher education as a tool for economic stimulus. Prominent among 
these official explanations for expansion was that it would be a response to “the 
widespread and ardent longing of the masses for their sons and daughters to receive 
higher education, [which] the government has a responsibility to do all in its power to 
satisfy.”1 Authorities also emphasized the importance of a strong university system in 
order to compete with other countries economically and culturally.2  
Perhaps most important to the expansion policy’s public relations campaign was 
the way it was couched in terms of a triumphant shift from “elite higher education” to 
“mass higher education,” which according to international consensus would be marked 
by a gross participation rate of 15% of the college-aged population.3 The MOE set 2010 
as the date by which to reach this threshold—a transition which would be a significant 
milestone not just in higher education policy but in China’s modernization, development, 
and competitiveness on the global stage.4 
It is possible that the MOE’s public support for university expansion was more 
than just rhetoric given the rapid pace of enrollment growth. As expansion continued, the 
goal of achieving the 15% participation rate soon moved back to 2005, and was finally 
achieved in 2002—only three years after the announcement of the expansion policy, a 
                                                
1 Gaige kaifang 30 nian Zhongguo jiaoyu gaige yu fazhan keti zu, Jiaoyu daguo de jueqi 1978–2008, 191. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Zha, 27; according to World Bank data for 1999, this is compared with a participation rate of around 8% 
in India, 50% in Russia, and 72% in the United States at the time. 
4 Gaige kaifang 30 nian Zhongguo jiaoyu gaige yu fazhan keti zu, Jiaoyu daguo de jueqi 1978–2008, 191. 
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full eight years ahead of schedule.5 As Chapter 2 showed, this rapid expansion cannot be 
explained by market forces alone. Did the MOE have a “change of heart” from its initial 
opposition to enrollment expansion, deciding to put its full force into the effort to achieve 
“mass higher education”? In order to evaluate this theory, it is necessary first to look at 
the MOE’s changing role in the Chinese state. 
As an office of the State Council, the Ministry of Education is the leading 
bureaucratic institution in charge of day-to-day activities related to Chinese education 
policy, including research, decision-making, national implementation, and evaluation; it 
has the authority to issue regulations which carry the force of law, second only to 
legislation passed by the National People’s Congress (NPC). Lower-level governments 
can make their own clarifications and adjustments, but at least on paper, their 
implementation of national education policy is legally required to follow MOE 
regulations.6  
In reality, however, the power of local governments over higher education 
increased significantly as a result of the de jure administrative decentralization of the 
higher education system, which took place mostly between 1999 and 2002. Whereas 
previously nearly all higher education institutions had been under the direct 
administration of either the MOE or other central ministries, they were gradually 
transferred to provincial or municipal jurisdiction.7 According to MOE statistics, the 
number of institutions under the administration of local governments grew from 759 in 
1998 to 1,154 in 2002. Meanwhile, the number of institutions directly under the control 
of central ministries and agencies fell from 263 to 111 over the same period. Of the 111 
                                                
5 Zha, 27. 
6 Xu Xiaozhou and Mei Weihui, Educational Policies and Legislation in China (Hangzhou: Zhejiang 
Daxue Chubanshe, 2009), 33-37. 
7 Li Lixu, “China’s higher education reform 1998-2003: A summary.” Asia Pacific Education Review 5.1 
(2004): 15 
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centrally administered universities in 2001, only about a third were run by agencies 
outside the MOE.8 While this process coincided with the years of rapid enrollment 
growth, there does not appear to be a relationship between the two from a policy-making 
standpoint. 
The process of decentralization allows local governments to wield a great deal of 
influence over education policy within their jurisdiction; moreover, as later chapters 
describe in more detail, these local government authorities often have their own priorities 
putting them at odds with the MOE. Because of decentralization, it seems unlikely that 
the Ministry of Education would have had the administrative capability to carry out a 
project as massive as rapid enrollment expansion. In the next section, I suggest that 
despite the MOE’s rhetoric in support of the transition to “mass higher education,” 
central planning played no role in actual enrollment growth. Enrollment expansion took 
place with no apparent plan or pattern, and the harm it caused to education quality, 
particularly the student-teacher ratio, is completely uncharacteristic of MOE policy. 
Furthermore, expansion resulted in a highly stratified higher education system in which a 
minor proportion of universities maintained their small enrollment size and elite status. 
The majority of enrollment growth, meanwhile, took place at lower-tier schools which 
were significantly less prepared for the burden. The Ministry of Education would have 
had neither the desire nor the administrative capability to implement such a stratified 
version of enrollment expansion, making this inequality another argument against central 
planning. Finally, I compare the MOE’s yearly national enrollment plans with actual 
recruiting numbers, revealing a significant gap between central policy goals and the 
reality of implementation. 
                                                
8 Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, “Putong gaodeng xuexiao jiben qingkuang” 
(Basic statistics of regular higher education institutions). MOE online database, 1998, 2002. 
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3.2—Unbalanced Higher Education Development 
In 1999, the first year of rapid enrollment expansion, the number of new 
enrollments in Chinese universities was about 43% higher than what it had been the year 
prior. The year 2000 saw another 42% increase—compounded together, these two years 
more than doubled the annual number of new recruitments.9 After these two years of 
rapid expansion, the growth rate slowed to the 20% range, falling gradually every year 
until it reached pre-1999 levels again in 2007, as can be seen in Figure 3.1. Enrollment 
numbers since 2007 have been much more stable, with recruitments typically expanding 
at 5% or less. 
Figure 3.1 
 
 
The tangled appearance of Figure 3.1 also suggests that geographically, 
enrollment growth during this period did not follow much of a pattern. This is confirmed 
in Table 3.1, below, which shows the change in higher education development status for 
                                                
9 National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China. Online database of national data: annual 
provincial indicators. http://data.stats.gov.cn/ 
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each province between 1997 and 2007.10 Measured in number of universities and total 
enrollment size, the distribution of higher education resources does not seem to 
correspond either to population or to the level of economic development; this was 
previously implied in Chapter 2, but here it can be seen more clearly. The perception of 
this lack of pattern is reinforced by the fact that the distribution of universities does not 
necessarily correspond with that of the students themselves.  
Table 3.1 
 
 
                                                
10 Ibid. 
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Despite this apparently haphazard distribution, some observations can be made 
about the data in Table 3.1. Over this period, higher education generally developed in 
favor of eastern provinces like Shandong and Jiangsu, which in 2007 had student bodies 
six to eight times their 1997 size. This was not always the case, however—Beijing had 
been home to more universities than any other province in 1997, but by 2007 it ranked 
only twelfth. While Liaoning built a larger number of new schools, its enrollments did 
not increase as much as might have been expected from this growth. Provinces with the 
fewest universities and smallest enrollment sizes were all in western China during both of 
the years compared here, yet the number of universities in both Chongqing and Sichuan 
experienced significant growth, and Shaanxi had many more students than its neighbors 
Gansu and Ningxia. 
Figure 3.2 
 
 
The student-teacher ratio, shown in Figure 3.2, indicates the degree to which 
universities became more understaffed over the course of enrollment expansion. 
Nationwide, the number of teachers and staff employed at Chinese universities grew at a 
much slower rate than the number of students enrolled. In 1999, there were only 5% more 
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teachers than there had been in 1998, while there were 20% more total students; the 
following year, the number of teachers grew by 9%, while students grew by 36%. Not 
until 2006-2007 did teachers grow at a rate comparable to students. In the intervening 
time, as Figure 3.2 shows, in-school university students increased from 3.4 to 18.8 
million, while teachers only increased from 0.4 to 1.2 million.11 The stark difference 
between student enrollment growth and the increase in the number of teachers suggests a 
precipitous decline in the quality of Chinese higher education, something it is difficult to 
imagine being the result of MOE planning. 
Another dimension of enrollment expansion is the distinction between four-year 
(benke) and two-year (zhuanke) degree-seeking students, similar to American bachelor’s 
and associate’s degrees, respectively. Students enrolled in technical zhuanke programs 
require lower scores on the national college entrance examination, and generally learn a 
specific, specialized skill set rather than receiving a comprehensive university education. 
Figure 3.3 (on the next page) shows that while in 1999, undergraduate benke and 
technical zhuanke programs expanded enrollments at similar rates of around 43%, the 
numbers for the following year are dramatically different. In 2000, technical zhuanke 
programs expanded new enrollments by over 70%; meanwhile, the enrollment expansion 
of undergraduate benke programs dropped down to 24%. Technical zhuanke programs 
continued to expand annual new enrollments faster than undergraduate benke programs, a 
trend that continued until 2006.12 
                                                
11 Ibid. 
12 Ministry of Education online database, 1998-2007. 
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Figure 3.3 
 
 
As decentralization continued and more schools were transferred from direct 
administration of the central government down to provincial and municipal levels, local 
institutions also expanded their enrollments much more quickly. This process can be seen 
in enrollment statistics available from the Ministry of Education, shown in Figure 3.4 (on 
the next page). In 1999, all centrally administered universities expanded at roughly 27%. 
Meanwhile, in the same year, locally-administered universities expanded new 
enrollments by nearly 50%. The difference was even more striking in 2000, when 
recruitments at locally-administered schools grew by more than 63%, while central 
universities actually decreased their number of new recruits. The process of 
decentralization in 1999-2000 obscures these figures somewhat, since locally-
administered schools may merely have been receiving new schools transferred over from 
central administration. However, a similar trend continued from 2001 to 2007, after the 
decentralization process had been mostly completed. While higher education institutions 
under the administration of local authorities continued to expand enrollments, the growth 
rate of centrally-administered institutions has remained near 1% ever since 2002.  
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Figure 3.4 
 
3.3—Making Sense of University Stratification 
The expansion of local universities more than their centrally-administered 
counterparts, when taken together with the expansion of undergraduate benke enrollments 
more than technical zhuanke recruits, make up what Qiang Zha calls the “pyramid” shape 
of the Chinese higher education system. In this highly stratified and hierarchical 
structure, the bulk of enrollment expansion has taken place among the “lower echelons” 
of provincial and local institutions.13 A small number of elite universities, meanwhile, 
have maintained much lower enrollment growth rates. These top-tier institutions, all of 
which belong to specially-funded elite university programs, are the only ones with the 
resources to focus on research and education quality. While enrollments at these key 
national universities only expanded from 1.36 million in 1997 to 1.63 million in 2005, 
                                                
13 Zha, 31. 
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lower-tier schools grew from 1.79 million to 11.89 million students over the same 
period.14  
This pyramid-shaped structure is significant not only because it remains one of 
the defining features of the Chinese higher education system to this day, but also because 
it represents a pattern of enrollment expansion directly contradictory to that originally 
recommended by Tang Min. A major argument in Tang Min’s proposal was that national 
key universities should expand enrollments more rapidly, as they alone had the resources 
and administrative capability to do so. Tang Min’s assumption that China’s well-funded 
elite universities would bear most of the load of enrollment expansion was crucial to his 
calculations regarding the feasibility of implementation.15 Yet through the formation of 
the “pyramid” structure, it can be seen that China’s unprecedented, massive expansion of 
enrollments took place primarily at the institutions that were the least prepared to deal 
with the burden. 
Given the status of the expansion policy as originating outside the Ministry of 
Education, one hypothesis is that the MOE had its own reasons for intentionally turning 
Tang Min’s formula upside down, and the “pyramid” structure was a product of central 
planning. In this interpretation, confronted with the task of dramatically expanding higher 
education enrollments against their better judgment, MOE officials coordinated policy 
implementation nationwide in such a way as to ensure that their efforts to improve 
education quality in the 1990s would not be entirely nullified. Such a strategy would 
allow total enrollment numbers to meet the requirements of top Party officials, while also 
safeguarding upper-tier universities from the detrimental effects of rapid enrollment 
expansion. 
                                                
14 Ibid. 
15 Tang Min, “Kuoda gaoxiao zhaosheng” 
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There are two main problems with this hypothesis, the first of which is that such 
an effort would have been completely uncharacteristic of education policy at the time. 
For a number of years, the MOE had sought to improve education quality. If the 
“pyramid” structure was an intentional policy outcome, it would imply a tradeoff on the 
part of the MOE—that is, more or less relinquishing education quality at non-elite 
institutions in favor of protecting their pet projects. These elite programs, however, were 
only the most visible representatives of a much larger effort to bring Chinese universities 
in line with those in developed countries. In other 1999 policy materials not directly 
related to expansion, such as reforms of the college entrance examination, improving 
education quality throughout Chinese universities is a major theme.16 Although the MOE 
was certainly keen to preserve education quality at elite universities, it does not follow 
that the policymakers were resigned to entirely abandoning the quality of the less-
prestigious institutions making up the rest of China’s higher education system.  
The second, more serious problem with this interpretation is that it ignores the 
effects of decentralization. Roughly two decades of decentralization before 1999 had left 
central ministries such as the MOE largely assuming an oversight role. Although the 
MOE had some authority to set national standards and guidelines, local education 
bureaus determined most of the details of education policy implementation—especially 
once most universities were transferred from direct MOE administration to that of 
provincial governments. Thus it seems unlikely that the stratifying trend of enrollment 
expansion followed a master plan set by the MOE. The massive scale of enrollment 
growth in 1999, as well as the announcement of the expansion policy only weeks before 
its implementation was to begin, are alone enough to make it an extremely ambitious 
program; even more unlikely is the suggestion that the MOE had the institutional 
                                                
16 Xu and Mei, Educational Policies and Legislation in China, 55-60. 
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capacity to force enrollment expansion upon universities that were physically and 
administratively the least prepared to do so. The “pyramid” pattern thus represents a state 
of affairs that the MOE would have been neither willing nor able to bring about. 
3.4—Evidence for Unauthorized Expansion 
China’s rapid achievement of the transition to “mass higher education” is a 
common refrain heard from education officials, but there is no evidence that it was an 
intentional policy outcome. Due to the MOE’s status as an organ of central authority in 
an increasingly decentralized state, it is highly doubtful that it was able to purposefully 
coordinate nationwide rapid enrollment expansion from Beijing. In this section, I provide 
evidence that in fact the opposite is true: from 2002 to 2007, the MOE unsuccessfully 
attempted to slow down rapid enrollment growth throughout higher education. 
Each year, four to five months before actual enrollment takes place, the MOE 
publicly announces its higher education recruitment plan for the entire country; these 
announcements can serve as a window into the MOE planning process. While these 
yearly plans cannot be found together in any single source, I have located and compiled 
online news articles reporting each annual plan from 1999 to 2007. Table 3.2 compares 
these yearly enrollment plans with actual recruitment numbers. 
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Table 3.2 
 
 
The fourth column in this table, showing the planned percentage increase in new 
university enrollments, is especially illuminative of the MOE’s strategy. The sharp drop 
in 2002, when recruitment was planned to increase by only 2.5% nationwide, corresponds 
to an important shift in the MOE’s approach to enrollment expansion. A May 2006 article 
in the China Youth Daily describes this shift in an interview with Li Zhiren, director of 
the Higher Education Research Center at the Central Education Institute. Director Li 
states that due to concerns over limited resources and facilities, the MOE decided to 
decrease enrollment growth dramatically in 2002. It was intended that from 2002 onward, 
expansion would be limited to 5-10% a year. Arresting enrollment growth would prevent 
any more damage being done to education quality.17 
Despite this attempt to hit the brakes on rapid expansion, however, actual 
enrollments continued to grow at about three times the planned rate. This was the 
beginning of a five-year period, visible in the rightmost column of Table 3.2, during 
which the MOE continuously tried to bring enrollment expansion under control. Between 
                                                
17 Jiang Xinjie, “Difang Zhengfu Weishenme Bei Kuozhao Chonghunle Tou?” (Why have local 
governments been driven giddy over enrollment expansion?) Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth Daily). 
May 18, 2006.  
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2002 and 2007, the difference between planned and actual enrollments gradually 
declined; it took half a decade for the MOE to succeed in restraining rapid enrollment 
expansion. The contrast between planned and actual enrollment numbers is indicative of 
the MOE’s inability to coordinate national higher education policy in the context of such 
severe decentralization.  
This chapter has enumerated several points of evidence against the hypothesis that 
MOE policy coordination was responsible for Chinese universities’ rapid enrollment 
growth. Enrollment expansion’s haphazard nature, its damage to education quality, and 
the increasing stratification it created, only make sense in view of decentralization and 
the MOE’s declining authority. The gap between planned enrollments and actual 
recruiting numbers solidifies the case against central planning, meaning that there must 
have been other factors driving rapid enrollment growth in opposition to the MOE’s 
attempted restraints. Whatever these other factors may have been, they were not simply 
macroeconomic in nature, as previously demonstrated in Chapter 2. In the following 
chapter, I review literature discussing the conceptual framework of fragmented 
authoritarianism, which may provide a better explanation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CHINESE STATE STRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKDROP 
4.1—Decentralization and Fragmented Authoritarianism 
The decentralization of the Chinese state resulted the MOE’s loss of power over 
higher education policy. As the previous chapters make evident, after top Party leaders 
intervened to launch the enrollment expansion policy, its implementation was to a great 
extent dictated by local factors rather than MOE directives. I argue that local 
governments’ runaway implementation of radical higher education expansion can only be 
understood within the context of the Chinese political and bureaucratic system, 
specifically the idea of fragmented authoritarianism. Before turning to the effects of this 
institutional environment on higher education, however, we must first establish the 
significance of decentralization in the Chinese political context. 
In the Chinese government, authority is shared between specialized, vertically-
integrated ministries of the central government (tiao), on one hand, and local government 
administrations at various horizontal levels (kuai) on the other. For example, the Bureau 
of Education of a certain city or province reports both to its own local government and 
also to the next-higher level within the education bureaucracy. Since the early 1980s, the 
Chinese state has undergone a continuous trend of bureaucratic and fiscal 
decentralization, in which both formal and informal power have shifted away from 
vertical tiao authority and into the hands of horizontal kuai authority. Recent decades 
have seen the emergence of an administrative system that is more cellular in nature, with 
local officials being given more autonomy to manage the various aspects of governance 
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under their jurisdiction.1 The resulting “fragmented authoritarianism” is a trademark 
feature of China’s bureaucratic system in the post-Mao era.2  
Jude Howell contends that decentralization is so widespread that it is difficult to 
talk of a Chinese “state” as a unitary actor at all. The behavior of government officials 
and institutions varies widely both geographically and over time, reflecting the increasing 
fragmentation of state authority. A number of factors contribute to the polymorphous and 
heterogeneous nature of Chinese policy implementation, such as persistent corruption, the 
decreasing financial dependence of local governments on the center, and state structures 
that tend to encourage personal and institutional survivalism rather than coherent national 
plans. 3  She writes that “local government officials in the context of significant 
decentralization are driven more by local and sometimes personal interests… resulting in 
unbalanced and uneven development.”4 Thus, although intended to support economic 
growth by encouraging local experimentation, decentralization has the side effect of 
weakening the ability of central government organs, such as the Ministry of Education, to 
monitor local officials and to ensure policy implementation follows its original intent. 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, local cadres gained increasing authority 
over the administration of Chinese higher education vis-à-vis the MOE, especially as 
individual universities were transferred from hierarchical tiao management to local kuai 
management. In the context of fragmented authoritarianism and decentralization, it is 
crucial to understand the motivations and priorities of these local officials, both at 
individual universities and at municipal or provincial governments. What are these 
                                                
1 Gong Ting and Chen Feng, “Institutional Reorganization and Its Impact on Decentralization,” in Jia Hao 
and Lin Zhimin, eds., Changing Central-Local Relations in China: Reform and State Capacity (San 
Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), 67-88. 
2 Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (NewYork: W.W. Norton, 
1995), 169-182. 
3 Jude Howell, “Reflections on the Chinese State.” Development and Change 37, no. 2 (2006), 284. 
4 Ibid., 283; 286-7 
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motivations, and to what extent are they at odds with the MOE’s ability to ensure its 
desired policy objectives are implemented? 
4.2—Local Government Incentives: Performance Evaluation and Cadre Mobility 
A major influence on the behavior of local officials is the fact that their career 
prospects are based upon their performance on a number of criteria, as rated by their 
superiors. Allowed the discretion to prioritize among a wide range of policy directives 
and government mandates of varying importance, officials naturally tend to focus more 
energy on those that will be most beneficial to their assessment.5 By far the most 
important of these criteria is economic growth, making cadres inclined to disregard 
lower-priority policy directives that may contradict short-term GDP numbers. In general, 
officials also prefer easily-measurable “hard targets” rather than goals that are less well-
defined or substantive.6 A focus on superficial achievements could lead cadres to use the 
education system as a tool for short-term economic growth instead of heeding MOE calls 
to invest in more teachers or higher-quality facilities. 
Another harmful institutional arrangement is the cadre exchange system, in which 
officials are rotated periodically and have only a brief tenure in any given locality. This 
system was put into place to prevent cronyism, but has reduced accountability, as 
officials are not held responsible for the long-term consequences of their actions.7 
According to Pierre Landry, municipal Party secretaries’ average term of office had 
dropped to a mere 2.5 years by 2001.8 Such short terms of office, in combination with 
                                                
5 Mayling Birney, “Decentralization and Veiled Corruption Under China’s ‘Rule of Mandates’.” World 
Development 53 (2014): 55-67. 
6 Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang, “Selective Policy Implementation in China.” Comparative Politics 
31, no. 2 (1999). 172-176. 
7 Ibid., 175 
8 Pierre F. Landry, Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party’s Control of Local 
Elites in the Post-Mao Era (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 90. 
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the incentives built into the evaluation system, lead to an almost universal focus on short-
term results over long-term development.9  
This state of affairs makes it easy for central policies to become distorted in their 
implementation, such as when local officials make unsound investments in order to 
artificially increase GDP, or set arbitrary and unrealistic quotas for things like criminal 
arrests or agricultural production.10 It is also common for cadres to launch “political 
achievement projects” (zhengji gongcheng), which can be extravagant construction works 
or ostentatious policy initiatives. Rather than being legitimate public services, these 
vanity projects are intended mainly to impress superior officials, and can also be handy 
sources of additional revenue streams. Because these officials will be transferred or 
promoted in a few short years, there is no incentive for them to exercise caution or 
financial restraint in these projects.11 
In order to interpret the negative effects of local officials’ high turnover rates, 
Eaton and Kostka turn to the work of the economist Mancur Olson on the role of time 
horizons in governance. While a “roving bandit” will take everything before moving to 
his next victim, a “stationary bandit” —in other words, a king—has a longer time 
horizon. This means that he can gain more in the long run by refraining from excessive 
taxation, providing public goods, and protecting his subjects. Even a predatory 
authoritarian regime, as long as it is relatively stable, has an incentive to promote health 
and prosperity in order to extract more income in the future.12 In this sense, highly 
mobile Chinese officials represent an unusually degenerate form of government, one that 
                                                
9 Yang Zhong, Local Government and Politics in China: Challenges from Below. Studies on 
Contemporary China (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), 119. 
10 Ibid., 141-143. 
11 Ibid., 142. 
12 Sarah Eaton and Genia Kostka, “Authoritarian Environmentalism Undermined? Local Leaders’ Time 
Horizons and Environmental Policy Implementation.” The China Quarterly (forthcoming), 7. 
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is likely to be marked by “rapacious behavior and underinvestment in public policies and 
public goods provision.”13 
Eaton and Kostka find evidence strongly supporting the application of Olson’s 
framework to the environmental policy implementation of Chinese officials. They find 
that cadres tend to focus primarily on policies that will have highly visible effects during 
their own tenure, and do not invest energy or resources on long-term sustainability or 
projects that have no immediate results. The short time horizons of these officials also 
results in their developing “a cavalier attitude toward costs,” because they can simply 
cover their spending with loans that will conveniently not come to term until after they 
have moved on to their next post.14 The focus on expensive political achievement 
projects (zhengji gongcheng) is another example of cadres’ short-sighted behavior, as is 
their tendency to “set even higher targets than the ones received from the upper level in 
order to impress their superiors.”15 
Chinese scholars have reached similar conclusions in their analysis of higher 
education. Huang and Pang write that since the university president (xiaozhang) and the 
Party secretary are both officials in the government bureaucracy, they are subject to the 
same rules of evaluation and promotion applied to all Chinese government cadres. As a 
result, they are likely to think of themselves as government officials first and foremost, 
with their current position as heads of a university being merely a temporary post.16 
Combined with an average tenure of only 4.1 years, the incentives of these officials can 
become highly distorted, with an undue focus on slogans such as “higher education 
                                                
13 Ibid., 8. 
14 Ibid., 13. 
15 Ibid., 15. 
16 Huang Weiting and Pang Xiaobo, “Gaoxiao Ruan Yusuan Yueshu de Zhidu Chengyin ji qi Zhili” 
(Institutional Causality of Soft Budget Constraints in Chinese Higher Education Sector and its Implications 
for Governance). Paper presented at annual Zhidu Jingjixue Nianhui, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangdong, 
October 2008. 5. 
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massification” (dazhonghua) and “gross enrollment rates.”17 Although the president is 
officially the financial and legal representative of the school, it is difficult to hold him 
accountable for excesses that may not come to light until after he has been transferred to 
a new position.18 
The figure Huang and Pang cite regarding university presidents’ average tenure 
comes from a 2005 survey of the presidents of 1,792 Chinese universities. Although the 
original survey results are not available, a People’s Daily article notes that the presidents 
of top-tier universities served for significantly longer periods, averaging 5.9 years; the 
president of Huazhong University of Science and Technology held the record at the time, 
with 7.7 years in office. 19  Assuming time horizon effects are present in the 
administration of the Chinese higher education system, this information implies that they 
are less severe at these elite universities. The article also reports that presidents of these 
elite institutions were more highly educated and more likely to have overseas experience. 
Furthermore, the reporter expresses concern that such short terms of office commonly 
lead to several undesired phenomena. Unfamiliar with the situation at their new post, 
officials may engage in rash and short-sighted behavior. Universities may also run into 
difficulties if successive presidents have conflicting goals or leadership styles.20  
Cao Shujiang similarly describes how the short tenure of university presidents 
plays a role in their incentives and priorities, particularly when it comes to the 
institutional debt used to pay for large-scale construction projects. The loans taken on by 
higher education institutions in China generally do not come to term for several years, by 
which time the president will often have been replaced by a successor. The new 
                                                
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 7. 
19 Yang Xuemei, “Zhongguo daxue xiaozhang pingjun nianling 52 sui, pingjun renqi 4.1 nian” (Chinese 
university presidents’ average age 52, average tenure 4.1 years), Renmin Ribao, August 8, 2007. 
20 Ibid. 
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president, furthermore, feels no responsibility for the debt taken on by his predecessor, 
and is likely to let it gather interest rather than be proactive about repayments.21  
The availability of loans may have been a key factor in university enrollment 
expansion, being necessary for the construction of the infrastructure needed to 
accommodate the massive influx of new students. In the next section, I review literature 
describing another major influence on the behavior of local cadres—their ability to take 
advantage of virtually unlimited free credit. 
4.3—Soft Budget Constraints on Local Cadres and University Administrators 
Lynette Ong writes that although local governments have the autonomy to borrow 
money from financial institutions, they do not have any incentive to repay these loans due 
to the implicit guarantee that the central government will bail them out if push comes to 
shove.22 As decentralization results in local levels of administration gradually becoming 
more powerful in relation to the center, local Party leaders wield significant influence 
over the loan decisions of state-owned financial institutions under their jurisdiction. 
These institutions are also strategically important to the center, however, since their 
bankruptcy would be a major threat to social stability—making them “too big to fail.” 
Aware of this situation and their own leverage, local government cadres abuse their 
authority to gain what is essentially free credit, with a result of reckless overspending and 
massive debt.23 This is a classic case of the “soft budget constraint” syndrome, a term 
                                                
21 Cao Shujiang, “Gaodeng xuexiao de ruan yusuan yueshu yu caiwu zizhuquan” (On soft budget 
constraint and financial decision-making right of public colleges). Gaodeng Jiaoyu Yanjiu 10, no. 26 
(2005). 50. 
22 Lynette H. Ong, “Fiscal federalism and soft budget constraints: The case of China.” International 
Political Science Review 33 (2012): 455-474. 
23 Ibid., 468. 
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coined by the economist János Kornai to describe the inefficient management of state-
owned enterprises in Eastern Europe.24 
In their definitive account of the soft budget constraint phenomenon, Kornai, 
Maskin, and Roland say that an organization is considered to have a hard budget 
constraint when “it must cover its expenditures out of its initial endowment and revenue. 
If it fails to do so and a deficit arises, it cannot survive without intervention.”25 Generally 
speaking, in a competitive environment, an organization’s continual loss-making would 
result in its eventual failure or elimination. The budget constraint is softened, however, 
when the organization does not have to take responsibility for its losses and thus is not 
forced to compete. Benefactors such as financial institutions or the state may intervene by 
extending assistance to the loss-making organization. In the case of state bailouts, 
concerns for economic or social stability often contribute to such a decision. Over time, 
such organizations may come to expect or even rely on being bailed out by this extra 
funding, removing their incentive to maximize profits or reduce costs—softening the 
degree to which their behavior is constrained by their budgetary limits and greatly 
reducing their efficiency.26 
The rescue of a struggling organization represents additional ex post funding that 
it would not have been granted originally. As such, this phenomenon is a result of 
information asymmetry—unlike its creditors, the budget-constrained organization has 
access to information about the level of efficiency of its use of funds, both past and 
future.27 If not for this unfair advantage, the initial funding could be adjusted to the 
appropriate amount, removing the need for a bailout later. Although originally used to 
                                                
24 Janos Kornai et al., “Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint.” Journal of Comparative Economics 26, 
no. 1 (2003): 11-17. 
25 Ibid., 4. 
26 Ibid., 14. 
27 Ibid., 18. 
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describe state-owned enterprises, the soft budget constraint syndrome can manifest itself 
in a number of other arenas—financial institutions, local governments, non-profit 
organizations (including universities), and even entire countries are all potentially 
prone.28 According to Kornai, the only requirement for a soft budget constraint to exist is 
that there must be a potential benefactor with the resources to administer a bailout and the 
motivation to do so—as such, they are particularly common in transition economies.  
The Chinese higher education system certainly seems to meet this description, 
being part of the same bureaucratic matrix of vertical and horizontal authority to which 
financial institutions and state-owned enterprises belong. Indeed, several scholars have 
drawn the connection between universities’ soft budget constraint and their institutional 
debt. Cao Shujiang notes that being a non-profit organization, a university’s funding is all 
earmarked for specific purposes, which leaves no room for non-budgeted costs. Should 
such costs arise, there is little alternative but to pay for them with credit; the budget 
typically does not contain an allowance for interest and payments on this debt, making 
such payments even more onerous.29  
Another complicating factor is that for both education and research, there is not 
necessarily a definite relationship between input and output as there would be in industry. 
The quality of education and the value of research products not only evade precise 
definition, they are also hard to predict for insiders and outsiders alike. This makes it 
difficult for administrators to allocate the optimal amount of resources ex-ante to any 
particular project or task.30 Because of their soft budget constraint, universities have no 
incentive to lower costs or increase efficiency. The right to take on loans is one of the few 
areas in which universities enjoy institutional autonomy; however, at present, universities 
                                                
28 Ibid., 5-6. 
29 Cao, “Gaodeng xuexiao de ruan yusuan yueshu,” 49. 
30 Ibid. 
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are not obligated to assume proportionate liability for these loans. 31  University 
administrators’ accompanying loss of responsibility for their behavior is a major problem 
in the higher education system, as this thesis demonstrates.  
Information asymmetry—when lenders have less information than borrowers—
also plays a role in the soft budget constraint of Chinese universities. “Just as a sick 
person has no way of knowing the medical skill of a doctor,” government officials who 
are not education experts have no way of evaluating the performance of universities 
under their jurisdiction.32 Higher education institutions thus lack external restraint due to 
the absence of effective government oversight. Yu Jianhai adds that since universities are 
state organs tasked with implementing government policy, the government is responsible 
for the expenses associated with this implementation, even when these costs lead to a 
budget deficit. Due to information asymmetry, however, the government has no reliable 
means of distinguishing legitimate policy burden expenses from those incurred as a result 
of mismanagement, graft, and intentional excess. Since the government eventually pays 
for all spending, whether through direct funding or ex-post support in the form of loans, 
higher education institutions have a hidden incentive to maximize their non-policy 
burden spending—in other words, to be as inefficient as possible. This type of behavior, 
Yu says, is common in Chinese universities, most notably marked by the zealous 
construction of new infrastructure beyond need or ability.33 
Both Cao and Yu note that Chinese universities face no threat of bankruptcy. Due 
to their importance for social stability and economic growth, the state is obligated to 
ensure that universities stay in operation. This forces the government to extend financial 
                                                
31 Ibid., 50. 
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assistance continuously, regardless of waste or inefficiency.34 Taking this idea to its 
logical conclusion, Huang and Pang suggest that universities’ social and economic 
importance—and, by extension, their bargaining power—is directly related to the number 
of students they enroll. Aware of this fact, universities may seek to become even more 
indispensable by maximizing enrollments, thus gaining a greater guarantee of 
government support.35 
In this chapter, I have described the shift of power away from centralized, vertical 
chains of command and into the hands of local governments with their own conflicting 
interests. This decentralization, when combined with incentives and loopholes within the 
Chinese political system, can lead to inefficient, wasteful, and predatory behavior on the 
part of local officials, in particular due to their soft budget constraint and their tendency 
to focus on personal advancement. Chinese-language academia indicates that these 
phenomena may also occur in the higher education system. In the context of this 
fragmented authoritarianism, one suspects that university administrators prioritize their 
own career prospects more than education quality, the welfare of students, or strict 
implementation of central policy from the MOE. In the following chapter, I investigate 
the actual effects of decentralization by looking at the differences between central and 
local university enrollments, as well as examining how unauthorized expansion stemmed 
from the bureaucratic enrollment procedures of lower-tier institutions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
34 Cao, “Gaodeng xuexiao de ruan yusuan yueshu,” 50; Yu, “Zhengcexing fudan, nixiang xuanze,” 39. 
35 Huang and Pang, “Gaoxiao Ruan Yusuan Yueshu,” 6. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FRAGMENTED AUTHORITARIANISM IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
5.1—Decentralization as Context for Uncontrolled Expansion 
Chapters 2 and 3 refuted two plausible explanations for Chinese universities’ 
rapid enrollment growth. Expanding enrollments was not a profitable market activity 
guided by supply and demand, as evidenced by its lack of correlation with 
macroeconomic factors. Neither was it a policy outcome coordinated by the central 
government—expansion followed no geographic pattern, damaged education quality, and 
exceeded plans set by the MOE. The only identifiable trend is one of stratification, in 
which lower-tier universities expanded enrollments much more quickly. In this chapter, I 
argue that the emergence of this “pyramid” holds the key to a novel explanation for 
university enrollment growth. Drawing upon the political and institutional literature 
discussed in the previous chapter, I contend that fragmented authoritarianism resulted in 
locally-administered universities suffering from adverse incentives, such as performance 
evaluation, cadre mobility, and the soft budget constraint syndrome. 
My hypothesis is that the MOE’s attempts to slow down enrollment expansion 
nationwide succeeded only in a minority of universities under its direct central control. 
The slower growth rate of these centrally-administered institutions is a better reflection of 
MOE policy than the wild expansion of low-tier, locally-administered schools. Centrally-
administered institutions—which also happened to be some of China’s most elite—were 
closely regulated, but local universities were in contrast much less affected by MOE 
policy oversight. As the MOE persistently attempted to rein in the expansion rate at all 
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levels, the “pyramid” that emerged was an accident of institutional arrangement rather 
than an intentional policy outcome. 
In this chapter, I describe how low-tier schools not only expanded much more on 
average, but also manifest a great deal of unexplained variation both geographically and 
over time. Central universities, in contrast, exhibit much more uniformity than their 
locally administered counterparts; they follow similar patterns nationwide because they 
all adhere to the same MOE guidelines. This fundamental dissimilarity between central 
and local institutions suggests that the institutional effects discussed in Chapter 4 affect 
central and local universities differently. The government officials responsible for 
locally-administered universities were more severely affected by “hard target” incentives, 
soft budget constraints, and short time horizons. I provide more indirect evidence that this 
is the case by examining Chinese university recruiting and enrollment procedures, 
particularly the loopholes and opportunities for abuse that exist in the process. 
5.2—Evidence for Fragmented Authoritarianism in Central-Local Differences 
Although a small amount of data is available from the Ministry of Education 
comparing enrollments at central and local universities, it includes only the national 
aggregate. Chapter 3 already made use of these national statistics to show that local 
universities expanded much more rapidly than their central counterparts, as Figure 3.4 
describes. This trend can be examined more closely by using additional data from the 
Chinese Education Finance Statistical Yearbook, which is also split into centrally and 
locally administered institutions, but includes a provincial instead of only national level 
of detail.1 In this section, I analyze data from 1998 to 2006 describing regular institutions 
                                                
1 Zhongguo Jiaoyu Jingfei Tongji Nianjian (China Education Finance Statistical Yearbook), Social and 
Technological Department, National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (Beijing: 
Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 1999-2007). 
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of higher education, a set that does not include adult education, distance learning, or non-
state (minban) institutions. Although this resource does not directly include enrollment 
numbers, it does record both per-student spending and total spending amounts for central 
and local universities in each province. Knowing these two numbers makes it possible to 
calculate the student enrollment size of central and local universities in each province. 
The result is only an estimate, but comparison with total provincial enrollments reported 
by China's National Bureau of Statistics shows that it is accurate enough for the purposes 
of this chapter. Figure 5.1 shows the result of this calculation for the entire country. 
Figure 5.1: Annual Estimated Enrollments at Central and Local Universities 
 
 
Nationally, while students at central institutions comprised the majority of 
Chinese university students in 1998, their numbers were overtaken by local university 
students in 1999—the first year of rapid enrollment expansion, and also a year in which a 
number of institutions were transferred from central to local administration. For the entire 
  49 
period shown in this data, enrollments at local universities continued to grow faster than 
at central universities. According to this estimate, the roughly 1.2 million local university 
enrollments made up only 41% of Chinese college students in 1998; by 2006, there were 
13.6 million students at locally administered universities, making up 81% of the total. 
This pattern corroborates Chapter 3’s description of increasing stratification as 
enrollments increased. 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the estimated number of students at central and local 
universities, respectively, for each province.2 In Figure 5.3, it can be clearly seen that the 
largest number of central-university students are located in Beijing. Hubei is in a 
relatively distant second place, while Shanghai and Jiangsu compete for third. Sichuan 
and Shaanxi lead the rest. This chart also shows that the distribution of central-university 
students became more unequal from 1998 to 2006. Beijing, which in 1998 made up 13% 
of the national total, by 2006 had nearly 20% of students at centrally administered 
universities. Additionally, the four top-ranking provinces for this measure remained the 
same in 1998 and 2006; that is, over this time period, there was no province from the 
bottom 27 that increased central-university enrollments enough to break into the top 4. 
These bottom 27 provinces, which in 1998 hosted 61% of central-university students, by 
2006 had only 51%. Overall, enrollment expansion in these centrally administered 
universities was gradual and relatively uniform, with already well-endowed provinces 
gaining an even greater advantage over this time period. 
                                                
2 A summary of this data may be found in Appendix 3. 
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Figure 5.2: Annual Estimated Provincial Enrollments at Central Universities 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Annual Estimated Provincial Enrollments at Local Universities 
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The situation shown in Figure 5.3 could not be more different. Locally 
administered universities have had a much more equitable distribution nationwide, with 
various provinces increasing enrollments faster or slower than others in different years, 
resulting in a very chaotic chart. Jiangsu, which had been on top continuously since 1999, 
was just barely surpassed by Shandong in 2006; several remote provinces like Ningxia 
and Qinghai stayed relatively stable at the bottom. In general, however, the number of 
local-university students who were enrolled in any given province in 1998 and that 
province’s rank in 2006 appear to have very little relationship. Liaoning, which had the 
fifth-highest number of local-university students in 1998, by 2006 had dropped to tenth 
place; in contrast, Henan and Hunan went from sixth and tenth place to third and fourth 
place, respectively.  
In short, unlike the gradual and uniform enrollment growth of centrally 
administered universities, locally administered schools expanded enrollments rapidly and 
at very uneven rates both geographically and over time. The lack of pattern shown in 
Chapter 3 exists almost solely at lower levels. On the other hand, elite, centrally-
administered institutions expanded at equally slow and even rates nationwide. In other 
words, their development shows every sign of being the result of state planning. This 
divergence suggests that over the course of decentralization, locally-administered 
institutions grew further and further from effective MOE control.  
5.3—Flexibility and Mechanisms of Abuse in the Enrollment Process 
In light of this data, I believe that without the oversight of a central authority, 
officials responsible for low-tier institutions—both within the universities themselves, 
and in the local governments to which they belonged—used enrollment expansion as a 
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means to an end. As a perfect example of a “hard target,” exceeding yearly recruiting 
numbers was an easy way for cadres to excel in their performance evaluation. The soft 
budget constraints of these universities enabled them to spend as much as needed to 
accommodate the new students—indeed, they may have taken advantage of the 
opportunity to spend as much as possible, benefitting personally from lucrative 
construction contracts as well as professionally from the high visibility and prestige of 
such projects. With short time horizons of only four years or so, they would have had no 
incentive to exercise restraint or forethought when it came to institutional debt or 
increasingly limited human and material resources.  
Spurred on by these incentives built into the Chinese bureaucracy, officials at 
low-tier universities continually increased enrollments beyond demand or capacity. In 
this section, I describe the bureaucratic procedure by which the government allocates 
college admission candidates to their eventual places on university rolls, making note of 
the points along this process at which there is the possibility of adjustment. I explain the 
mechanism for “unauthorized” enrollment expansion, a term that encompasses several 
schemes low-tier universities employed in their insatiable drive to exceed recruiting 
quotas. Finally, I discuss several factors that make locally-administered institutions more 
vulnerable to abuse. 
The Chinese university enrollment process is complicated and enigmatic even to 
many Chinese people. With each provincial-level authority having its own committee or 
bureau in charge of college enrollment work in that region, in addition to ongoing 
reforms and adjustments to the system, a concise explanation is elusive. What follows is a 
typical, slightly simplified version of the process that I have synthesized from a number 
of sources, including MOE documents, news articles, and my own interviews and 
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discussions with Chinese people.3 While this description may not encompass the entire 
enrollment process in all its complexity, it is invaluable in revealing how the bureaucratic 
procedure of university recruitment exacerbated inequality in the higher education 
system. 
China’s annual college entrance examination, the gaokao, is famous for the stress 
it puts on high school students. Since most have no siblings, they face immense pressure 
to succeed so that they can grow up to support both parents and two sets of grandparents. 
The college entrance examination is the only chance most Chinese young people will 
have to build a successful life—a situation to which they refer despondently as “a single 
test to determine a whole life’s fate” (yikao ding zhongshen). Although the basic contour 
of the gaokao system is common knowledge, exactly how the test-takers earn their final 
university placement is less widely known.  
When the relevant departments (usually provincial-level) finish the scoring of the 
annual college entrance examination, the passing scores are divided into four “batches” 
or recruiting rounds (pici luqu). Higher education institutions are likewise organized into 
four tiers—three levels of four-year undergraduate (benke) universities, and a fourth level 
at the bottom consisting of shorter technical degrees (zhuanke). A first-tier university is 
defined as one that has been granted the right to enroll students from the first recruiting 
round, and so on.4 The catch is that the higher education bureaucracy plans the recruiting 
rounds so that there are more students in each round than there are planned open spots in 
the corresponding university tier. 
                                                
3 All consulted materials may be found in the bibliography; for a typical news article, see “Jiaoyubu 
zhaokai fabuhui jieshao gaoxiao zhaosheng ‘Yangguang Gongcheng’ deng qingkuang” (MOE convenes 
news conference to explain the ‘Sunshine Project’ and other situations regarding higher education 
enrollment), PRC Central People’s Government Online Portal, June 26, 2006. 
4 Hence the Chinese name for the university tiers (yiben, short for diyipi benke, etc.) 
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Every university is responsible for organizing a committee to determine its 
planned recruitments for the coming year, in consultation with approximate national and 
provincial enrollment targets received from the MOE. The provincial-level education 
bureau must approve the enrollment plans of each individual school, and then compile 
them to determine the total number of planned spots in each of the four tiers. To decide 
the number of students who will be candidates for recruitment in each round, the number 
of planned spots in the corresponding tier is increased by a certain proportion set by the 
MOE, typically around 20%.  
For example, if all the Tier 1 universities in a province have a combined planned 
enrollment size of 100 students, and the MOE has set the size of the first recruiting round 
at 20% larger than planned enrollments, the provincial authority will set a score threshold 
(fenshuxian) for the college entrance examination such that the top 120 students will be 
eligible for the first recruiting round. Similar score thresholds are drawn for the second, 
third, and fourth rounds of recruits, with the size of each recruiting round always being 
larger than the number of planned university spots in the corresponding tier. This surplus 
allows universities flexibility in the number of students they end up actually recruiting. 
Even more complex is the next stage of the enrollment process, which is called 
“sending [student] files” (toudang). As part of the college entrance examination process, 
each student lists a number of potential schools and academic majors, ranked by 
preference (tianbao zhiyuan). After the provincial education authorities set the score 
thresholds for each recruiting round, they send the personal file of each student in the first 
round to the student’s preferred Tier 1 school. When schools receive more student files 
than their planned enrollment quota, they are authorized to recruit as many as possible 
from this surplus, limited again to a certain proportion set by the government. After all 
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planned Tier 1 spots are accounted for, the provincial government proceeds with the 
second round of recruiting, and so on.5 
Suppose a Tier 1 school originally planned 100 new recruitments, but it received 
the files of 120 students in Round 1 who had listed it as a first preference. The school 
might recruit 105 of these students, if it wanted, but the fifteen lowest-scoring students 
would probably then be dropped to Round 2—where they would be recruited by a Tier 2 
university. This is bad luck on the part of the leftover students, who would have been 
given a spot at a higher-ranked institution if only they had listed a different preference. 
The other lucky five students, however, benefit from being above the score threshold for 
the first recruiting round even though they were outside the school’s original enrollment 
target. This is called “expansion within the plan” (jihua nei kuozhao).  
This type of expansion will not affect the total number of new enrollments 
nationwide, as it occurs only within each round of recruitments. It is not considered 
illegal or disreputable by the MOE, since the students recruited in this manner are all 1) 
students who legitimately reached the score thresholds both of the school and of the 
corresponding recruiting round, and 2) who did in fact list the school as a preference. The 
upper limit of this built-in flexibility would be for a university to recruit all 120 of the 
students whose files it receives. 
Regarded less favorably, however, is “expansion outside the plan” (jihua wai 
kuozhao).6 This illegal enrollment expansion occurs when higher education institutions 
recruit ineligible students from below the score threshold, or students who did not 
initially list them as a preference, often via dubious “intermediary agencies” (zhongjie 
                                                
5 In recent years, the MOE has transitioned to a system in which each recruiting round takes place 
simultaneously (pingxing luqu), but this reform introduces a whole new level of complexity and is outside 
the scope of this overview. 
6 This type of expansion was implicitly allowed during the initial stage of rapid enrollment growth in 
1999-2001, but later became a major target of the MOE’s later policy measures, as discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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jigou). Expansion outside the plan typically involves the charging of excessively large 
fees in exchange for adding a few points on the exam or altering a student’s previously 
declared school preferences. This practice takes advantage of university applicants’ 
vulnerable position, as many hopeful candidates would naturally do anything to please 
their families and secure a place on university rolls. The prevalence of this phenomenon 
is attested by the existence of pithy phrases such as “fen bugou, qian lai cou” (Money can 
cover the difference if the score is too low). 
While both university officials and members of the education bureaucracy might 
openly solicit bribes for these services, this seems to be less frequent than some might 
expect: government officials are not necessarily the ones materially profiting from these 
activities, especially when intermediary agencies are used. Due to the system of cadre 
evaluation based primarily on hard targets like enrollment numbers, the benefit that 
higher education officials stand to gain from “expansion outside the plan” is at least as 
much political as it is monetary. Officials themselves are probably just as concerned 
about their enrollment quotas as students are about being accepted into college. Thus, 
while outright corruption may simply not be worth the risk for cadres concerned about 
their career paths, going through intermediary recruiting agencies is a less dangerous 
option. As these intermediaries occupied a legal grey area until an MOE crackdown 
around 2005, they could potentially help university officials avoid the appearance of 
misconduct and even gain plausible deniability. In a sense, the intermediary actually 
performs a valuable service by bridging the gap between supply and demand, reducing 
the inefficiency built into the enrollment process—notwithstanding the exorbitant fees 
they charge for doing so. 
There are other methods of unauthorized expansion possible during the 
enrollment process. One of the simplest is for a university to surreptitiously lower its 
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score threshold across the board so that it can admit a large number of students who 
would previously have been considered unqualified. If need be, schools also sometimes 
fudge on government-mandated gender ratios, distribution of academic majors, and 
ethnic minority representation in order to meet the hard target for new enrollments. Low-
tier schools may find it difficult to recruit an adequate proportion of females or ethnic 
minorities, and it is also common for them to expand enrollments in majors where there is 
less overhead cost, such journalism, history, or literature. These types of adjustments, 
when made without the approval of the education bureaucracy one level up, are likewise 
part of a legal grey area that the MOE reformed starting around 2005. 
The nature of the Chinese higher education system made “expansion outside the 
plan” a much more severe problem at lower tiers. Since the distribution of student files 
during the toudang phase is based upon the student’s own preference, each university will 
have a different proportion of planned enrollment spots to the number of student files 
they receive. Well-known universities tend to be disproportionately represented among 
students’ preferences, meaning that higher-tier schools have more eligible students to 
choose from than their lower-tier counterparts. Meanwhile, very few students are likely to 
list a no-name technical school among their ranked preferences. When these low-tier 
universities fail to receive enough student files to fill their originally planned enrollment 
quota, “expansion outside the plan” is a tempting solution. 
Exacerbating this discrepancy is the fact while lower-tier colleges have a simple 
mission to provide as much access to “basic” higher education as possible, higher-tier 
universities have a more complex social role involving not only undergraduate education 
but also graduate studies, scholarly research and international academic cooperation.7 
Thus, while officials at technical (zhuanke) schools and third-tier undergraduate (benke) 
                                                
7 Cao, “Gaodeng xuexiao de ruan yusuan yueshu,” 49. 
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universities are concerned primarily with meeting enrollment quotas, as there are few 
other targets or evaluations to strive for, second- and first-tier benke institutions simply 
have more things to worry about. For them, reaching or minimally exceeding the planned 
enrollment quota is enough—expanding too much could jeopardize the reputation of the 
school or the quality of its education. Finally, prestigious universities are more under the 
public view, decreasing their potential options for abuse or illicit behavior.  
Under these circumstances, lower-tier schools’ drive for enrollment expansion 
was uncontrollable, and their soft budget constraint meant they could spend as much as 
needed to continue expanding—indeed, the more spending, the better. And yet while they 
did have access to the leftover students from the first and second recruiting rounds, many 
of these lower-tier schools still had trouble meeting their planned enrollment quotas. This 
left them with no option but to “recruit outside the plan.” Using the methods described 
above, third-tier universities enrolled students whose exam scores only qualified them for 
technical zhuanke degree programs, and zhuanke schools enrolled large numbers of 
students who—according to the score thresholds set by education authorities—were 
completely unqualified to attend college.  
Thus, the problem of unauthorized enrollment expansion was increasingly severe 
at each lower tier—not affecting first-tier universities at all, but affecting third-tier and 
zhuanke institutions severely. Furthermore, while higher-tier schools’ expansion was 
“within the plan” and did not directly affect the total number of new enrollments 
nationwide, expansion at lower tiers was “outside the plan” and resulted in an actual net 
increase in the total number of students admitted—in effect, raising the pass rate of the 
college entrance examination to a higher point than the MOE intended.  
As locally-administered institutions grew further from MOE control due to 
decentralization, the effects of fragmented authoritarianism made them susceptible to a 
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variety of different kinds of abuse. Not only was there corruption, as might be expected; 
the “hard target” nature of the enrollment expansion policy incentivized local cadres to 
pursue its implementation with reckless enthusiasm, enabled by their soft budget 
constraint. This phenomenon, made possible by the bureaucratic arrangement of the 
university recruitment process, is additionally supported by the geographic contours of 
central and local enrollment growth. Central universities were both more restrained in 
their expansion, and also followed similar trajectories from province to province; local 
institutions, in contrast, grew in a haphazard manner that defies explanation as part of 
either a market economy or a central plan. In the final chapter, I examine the end of rapid 
enrollment expansion as the MOE took measures to improve its monitoring capability 
and reduce the negative effects of fragmented authoritarianism.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: REASSERTION OF CENTRAL AUTHORITY? 
6.1—The End of Uncontrolled Expansion 
In the preceding chapters of this thesis, I have explored a number of explanations 
for Chinese higher education’s unprecedented enrollment expansion. I demonstrated the 
insufficiency of accounts based on market economics as well as central planning, and I 
proposed a new hypothesis grounded in literature on the decentralization and 
fragmentation of Chinese state authority. Only one question remains: How did the 
Ministry of Education finally succeed in restraining this runaway enrollment expansion? 
In this concluding chapter, I supply a tentative answer to this question by evaluating the 
countermeasures taken by the Ministry of Education during the period of uncontrolled 
growth from 2002 to 2007. My findings suggest that the uncontrolled growth of locally-
administered universities did not stop until the MOE was able to enforce better 
monitoring at lower levels. I close with a few remarks on the implications of my research 
for understanding the fragmentation of the Chinese state, as well as the future of higher 
education policy. 
The expansion of university enrollments in 1999 and 2000, and to a lesser extent 
in 2001, had no historical precedent in its rapidity or massive scale. The total student 
body of Chinese universities in 2001 more than doubled in size compared to just three 
years earlier, rising from 3.4 million in 1998 to 7.2 million. This increase fundamentally 
changed the landscape of higher education in China. By the time the 2002 college 
recruiting season was drawing near, MOE officials confronted the question of how to 
mitigate the huge strain that enrollment expansion would place on universities’ 
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infrastructure and resources. Since it was clearly unsustainable to continue growing 
enrollments at such a feverish pace, by 2002 the MOE had decided to increase new 
recruits by only 2.5%, much slower than 2001’s increase of 21.6%. 
It was at this juncture that MOE officials most likely began to notice the problems 
caused by the fragmentation of central authority, namely, local institutions’ incentive and 
capability to keep expanding enrollments against the will of the MOE. For instead of a 
2.5% growth rate, new enrollments at Chinese universities that year increased by yet 
another 19.4%. Over the following five years, the MOE continuously tried to reduce the 
annual recruitment expansion rate to the low single digits, finally succeeding in 2007—
the first recorded year for which total recruits were actually within the planned amount. 
Figure 6.1 shows this development in detail.1 
Figure 6.1 
 
 
                                                
1 This is the same information also shown in Table 3.2 
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We can assume that the gap between the two lines, the difference between 
planned enrollment growth and the actual numbers, is more or less equivalent to 
“expansion outside the plan” as discussed in Chapter 5—when lower-tier universities 
used questionable methods to draw from a pool of under-qualified students in order to 
make up for recruitment shortages and meet or surpass enrollment quotas. In absolute 
terms, this amount increased every year from 2002 to 2004 and fell again in 2005-07; in 
2007, there were 10,000 fewer new enrollments than planned. In relative terms, as Figure 
6.1 shows, the additional, unplanned growth rate of new enrollments was gradually 
reduced from 2002 to 2006 and finally completely eliminated in 2007. In 2002, 
recruitments grew by 19.4% instead of the planned 2.5%, an excess of 17 percentage 
points; by 2007, the new enrollment growth rate was only 3.6% instead of the planned 
3.8%. While MOE officials must have been alerted to the severity of unplanned 
expansion by 2002 at the latest, it took them five more years to identify the source of the 
problem and take effective preventative measures. 
6.2—MOE Responses to Unauthorized Expansion, 2002-2004 
The documents I examine in the following two sections reveal an evolution of the 
MOE’s countermeasures against uncontrolled enrollment expansion, from early stages to 
eventual success. The MOE attempted to improve supervision over the college 
recruitment and enrollment process in 2003-04 by making rules and guidelines more 
explicit and by emphasizing the responsibility of leading cadres over their subordinates, 
but these relatively traditional countermeasures met with limited success. In 2005, a new 
and more effective approach came to the forefront: mandating the use of computer 
systems both for record-keeping and for the entirety of the enrollment process. Although 
this was done in the name of transparency and “information openness” (xinxi gongkai), it 
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had the additional effect of greatly improving the capability of upper bureaucratic levels 
to monitor the work of local cadres. Below, I describe both the earlier and later measures, 
as well as the effects they had on the enrollment process and on the higher education 
bureaucracy in general.  
This is by no means a comprehensive review of contemporary MOE higher 
education policy; I have only used documents that are publicly available, which represent 
only the surface level of the policy process. Moreover, although the MOE website makes 
available a wide range of policy announcements, it is not a complete set, with records for 
earlier years becoming more scattered and only a handful of documents available from 
more than a decade or so ago. I have attempted to sift through these documents in search 
of relevant information and put together a rough understanding of the reality behind the 
bureaucratic jargon and rhetoric, using contemporary news articles as supplemental 
evidence. These documents reveal a clear shift in MOE approach over the early-mid 
2000s. 
In 2001, the MOE had not yet begun its efforts to limit enrollment expansion. 
This fact can be seen in the 2001 edition of the annual notice that the MOE sends down to 
relevant lower departments concerning college recruitment and enrollment work. The 
very first item in this notice, instructing cadres to follow the relevant guidelines and make 
serious efforts to reinforce lawful implementation of the year’s recruitment, makes these 
admonitions only “amid the continuing expansion of yearly enrollment size.”2 This 
concession—that any other concurrent education reforms, such as adjustments to the 
                                                
2 MOE, “Jiaoyubu guanyu zuohao 2001 nian putong gaodeng xuexiao zhaosheng gongzuo de tongzhi” 
(MOE notice on carrying out regular higher education institutions’ 2001 recruitment work). Item 1. 
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college entrance examination, are to be carried out only in the shadow of rapid 
enrollment growth—is identical with that used in previous years.3 
The 2001 notice does employ rather strong language condemning any 
unauthorized adjustment of enrollment quotas. Strangely, however, this reprimand seems 
to be primarily against reduction rather than expansion. Universities are “generally not 
allowed to decrease the enrollment plan” previously approved by the relevant provincial-
level authority; completing the total number of planned recruitments takes priority over 
other quotas, such as those for majors or academic domains.4 Indeed, instructions are 
provided for how to increase enrollments wherever possible, by recruiting students “from 
below the university’s own actual score threshold, but above the score threshold for the 
relevant recruiting round.” 5  While this method would later be frowned upon as 
“expansion outside the plan,” that label is not used here—at this point in time, it is 
explicitly allowed.  
For this reason, 2001 can clearly be grouped with 1999 and 2000 as part of the 
period in which the MOE oversaw and even encouraged massive increases in recruitment 
numbers. The MOE’s shift away from this mode began in 2002. The introductory note at 
the beginning of its 2002 enrollment guidelines states that “in contrast with previous 
years, there are some relatively large changes” in the 2002 guidelines.6 Although there 
are not specific restrictions on enrollment expansion, the language discussing any 
adjustments to the plan is much more reserved. Officials are instructed to increase 
planned recruitments only in areas where higher education remains underdeveloped 
despite a large supply of high-quality candidates. Furthermore, while increasing 
                                                
3 MOE, “2000 nian putong gaodeng xuexiao zhaosheng gongzuo guiding (Regular higher education 
institutions’ 2000 recruitment work guidelines). 
4 MOE (2001), Item 7 
5 Ibid. 
6 MOE, “2002 nian putong gaodeng xuexiao zhaosheng gongzuo guiding (jiexuan)” (Regular higher 
education institutions’ 2002 recruitment work guidelines (abridged)). 
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enrollments may be used as a tool to adjust the distribution of students’ majors and 
geographic origins, any unplanned expansion should take place only with reference to the 
local economic situation, especially the job market.7 The number of student files a school 
may receive is also fixed at no more than 120% of its planned enrollments.8 
As Figure 6.1 shows, however, new enrollments in 2002 grew by 19.4% instead 
of the planned 2.5%. The MOE’s attitude toward this dramatic unplanned expansion, as 
well as clues about the mechanism through which it occurred, can be inferred from a 
strongly-worded statement the following year, articulated in its annual notice on 
university recruitment in 2003:  
During the recruiting process, it is strictly prohibited for any higher education 
institution to admit “students outside the plan” or to entrust “intermediary agents” 
with recruitment; it is strictly prohibited for any work unit or individual to charge 
fees in the name of “increasing the plan” … In the event that [such behavior] 
occurs, it will be subject to strict investigation and discipline according to the 
appropriate regulations.9 
 
In official MOE notices and policy documents from this point onward, similarly 
forceful wording appears with frequency. Of particular note is that this is apparently the 
first mention of the intermediary recruiting agencies universities had been employing to 
carry out unauthorized enrollment expansion—a practice that the MOE continued to 
crack down upon in the following several years. The 2003 recruitment guidelines also 
seem to be more detailed and explicit than in the past, as the MOE tried to close 
loopholes or places where there could be misunderstanding of its intentions. There is 
much more focus on the orderly and lawful implementation of the recruitment process—
                                                
7 Ibid., Items 14, 16, 19 
8 Ibid., Item 22 
9 MOE, “Guanyu zuohao 2003 nian putong gaodeng xuexiao zhaosheng gongzuo de tongzhi” (Notice on 
carrying out regular higher education institutions’ 2003 recruitment work). Jiaoxue 2003, no. 1. Item 6. 
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suggesting that rules and standards such as these ought to have a higher priority than the 
“hard target” of simple enrollment quotas.10 
These early efforts by the MOE met with no success—enrollment expansion in 
2003 continued at almost the same uncontrolled rate as the previous year. Increasingly 
alarmed, in June 2004 the MOE launched a campaign targeting four types of undesired 
behavior with the slogan “Three Not-Authorized, One Forbidden” (San Buzhun, Yi 
Jinzhi).11 First on this list, in very clear terms, is a blanket prohibition on “unauthorized 
expansion of enrollment plans.” The other “Not-Authorized” behaviors include recruiting 
candidates who do not meet admission criteria; and forming illicit partnerships between 
universities and testing authorities. “Forbidden” refers to a larger range of “corrosive” 
and “meddlesome” activities, including different types of corruption as well as any 
official involvement in intermediary recruiting agencies.12 
The “Three Not-Authorized, One Forbidden” campaign was framed in terms of a 
renewed focus on improving supervision and responsibility within the bureaucracy. A 
clearly delineated system of responsibility (zerenzhi) was central to this effort. All levels 
were instructed to be firm in the management of their subordinates, to exercise self-
restraint and self-discipline in their own affairs, and to submit to supervision and 
inspection from their superiors. 13  The MOE also encouraged lower levels to put 
additional energy into improving awareness of the systems of responsibility and 
supervision, in order to “reinforce interior management and formulate effective restraint 
                                                
10 MOE, “2003 nian putong gaodeng xuexiao zhaosheng gongzuo guiding” (Regular higher education 
institutions’ 2003 recruitment work guidelines). Jiaoxue 2003, no. 1. 
11 MOE, “Jiaoyubu guanyu zuohao 2004 nian putong gaodeng xuexiao zhaosheng zhifa jiancha gongzuo” 
(MOE notice regarding enforcement and inspection of higher education institutions’ 2004 recruitment 
work). Jiaojian 2004, no. 7. Item 2. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., Items 1, 4, 5, 7 
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mechanisms.”14 It should be noted, however, that this increased emphasis on effective 
management seems to be directed just as much against the illegal charging of fees (luan 
shoufei) as against unauthorized expansion.15 Indeed, the two types of misbehavior seem 
to be closely linked in the view of the MOE—a fact which can be considered as evidence 
for widespread corruption linked to the recruiting process. 
6.3—Sunshine Project and the Reassertion of Central Authority 
Despite the earnestness of the MOE’s 2004 efforts, they do not appear to have 
been immediately successful, at least based upon new enrollment numbers: expansion 
slowed to 17.1%, but this was still much faster than the MOE-planned growth rate of 
4.7%. In response to this repeated failure, early 2005 saw the launch of yet another 
campaign, this one with the slightly catchier title, “Sunshine Project” (Yangguang 
Gongcheng). 16  Later to become the MOE’s most significant countermeasure to 
uncontrolled expansion and illegal fee-charging, the Sunshine Project’s importance can 
be surmised from its appearance near the beginning of virtually every MOE policy 
document and official notice from early 2005 to the present.  
Although the Sunshine Project encompassed many familiar points of emphasis 
like responsibility and supervision, this program primarily focused on improving 
communication and transparency.17 The main substance of the program consisted of “Six 
Opennesses” (Liu Gongkai). Every level of the higher education bureaucracy was 
                                                
14 MOE, “Guanyu jiaqiang 2004 nian putong gaodeng xuexiao zhaosheng luqu guanli gongzuo de jinji 
tongzhi” (Urgent notice regarding reinforcement of supervision for regular higher education institutions’ 
2004 recruitment and enrollment). Jiaoxueting 2004, no. 12. Item 1. 
15 Ibid., Item 3 
16 There have been multiple unrelated Chinese policy initiatives with this name, notably a career-training 
program for rural residents that started at roughly the same time. Information about the particular 
“Sunshine Project” discussed here can be found under headings such as “Gaoxiao Zhaosheng Yangguang 
Gongcheng” (Higher Education Recruitment Sunshine Project) 
17 MOE, “Guanyu gaodeng xuexiao zhaosheng gongzuo shishi yanggong gongcheng de tongzhi” (Notice 
regarding the implementation of ‘Sunshine Project’ for higher education institutions). Jiaoxue 2005, no. 4. 
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required to disclose to the public all information in the following six areas: enrollment 
policies; university qualifications and admission criteria; recruitment planning; 
enrollment information; application procedures; and the results of disciplinary 
investigations into major legal violations.18  
In the context of Chinese governance in the twenty-first century, a major 
component of the “information openness” slogan is the creation of official websites. In 
recent years, all official organs have been required to create and maintain websites 
containing statistical and administrative information, policies and regulations, and so on. 
In practical terms, this requires the use of standardized electronic systems for operations 
and record-keeping. It is no coincidence that while the MOE was promoting the Sunshine 
Project, it also began to mandate that all universities adopt standardized online 
application and registration systems. 19  When all levels of the higher education 
bureaucracy carry out their daily operations using centralized computer systems to which 
the MOE presumably has backdoor access, it becomes much more difficult for lower 
officials to abuse their authority during the recruitment and enrollment process. Thus, 
even though the Sunshine Project was ostensibly aimed at making the higher education 
bureaucracy more transparent to the public, “information openness” had the additional 
effect of improving the monitoring and supervision capability of upper government 
levels.  
In this environment, the MOE’s increasingly firm admonitions against 
unauthorized expansion, illegal fee-charging, and other forms of abuse no doubt carried 
much more weight. Indeed, much of the language from the 2004 “Three Not-Authorized, 
                                                
18 Ibid.; see also “Jiaoyubu jiang shishi ‘Liu Gongkai’ de Yangguang Gongcheng ezhi zhaosheng fubai” 
(MOE to implement Sunshine Project’s ‘Six Opennesses’ to crack down on recruitment corruption). 
Xinhua News Agency, March 9, 2005.  
19 MOE, “Guanyu zuohao 2005 nian quanguo putong gaodeng zhaosheng luqu gongzuo de tongzhi” 
(Notice on carrying out national regular higher education recruitment and enrollment work). Jiaoxue 2005, 
no. 9. Item 3. 
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One Forbidden” campaign remained in place in 2005 policy documents, rephrased under 
the somewhat simpler term “Six Not-Authorized” (Liu Buzhun). Standardizing 
procedures and clarifying the delineation of responsibilities continued to be at the 
forefront. Higher education institutions were explicitly forbidden from expanding their 
enrollment plans without provincial-level authorization, and evasion of this requirement 
was considered a serious offense.20 Other recurring points included prohibitions on 
admitting unqualified students, involvement in intermediary recruiting agencies, and 
charging any fees in connection with college recruitment.21 
The information openness brought about by the Sunshine Project, in combination 
with the continuing implementation of the 2004 campaign stressing responsibility and 
supervision, led to a distinct drop in the number of unplanned recruitments in 2005. New 
enrollments grew by 12.8%, from 4.47 to 5.04 million. This was still greater than the 
MOE’s planned growth rate of 6.2%, but the excess was less severe than it had been in 
previous years. More importantly, 2005 was the beginning of the end for uncontrolled 
recruitment expansion. Unplanned enrollment growth fell even more sharply in 2006, and 
by 2007, for the first time, the total number of university recruits was actually less than 
the planned amount—5.66 million, instead of 5.67 million. This landmark was achieved 
not due to any major new policies from the MOE, but rather as a result of the ongoing 
implementation and strengthening of the 2004 and 2005 initiatives.  
Recurring ideas and familiar wording from these programs feature prominently in 
the MOE’s annual recruitment notices and enrollment guidelines for both 2006 and 2007. 
The Sunshine Project is the first thing mentioned in documents from both years; detail 
                                                
20 Ibid., Item 2. 
21 MOE, “Jiaoyubu guanyu shixing gaodeng xuexiao zhaosheng gongzuo zerenzhi ji zeren zhuijiu zanxing 
banfa” (MOE provisional measures concerning the implementation of responsibility system and 
responsibility investigations in higher education institutions’ recruitment work). Jiaojian 2005, no. 4. 
Article 6, Items 1-3. 
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and reinforcement of content from the “Six Opennesses” and “Six Not-Authorized” 
campaigns reappear frequently. In 2006, the MOE once again stressed the need for 
clearly-defined responsibilities, including the duty of provincial-level officials to conduct 
careful oversight and regular investigation of their subordinates at lower-level 
governments and individual schools. These provincial officials, in turn, were instructed to 
keep a telephone hotline open for direct communication with the central MOE. All 
adjustments to the planned enrollment numbers of individual universities required the 
approval of the relevant provincial-level authority; since provincial enrollment plans were 
fixed, in practice this meant that expansion at one school could only be approved by 
decreasing the planned enrollments of a different university.22  In addition, as the 
migration to electronic systems continued to advance, the MOE mandated that all 
adjustments of any kind were to be entered in a unified national online system, further 
decreasing the ability of cadres at every level to engage in corrupt or illegal behavior.23 
The MOE held a press conference in June 2006 to build public awareness of its 
work on improving the transparency and responsibility of the college recruitment and 
enrollment process. Lin Huiqing, head of the MOE’s Bureau of Students, elaborated upon 
the full scope and ambition of the Sunshine Project’s coming stages. Building on the 
foundation of the “Six Opennesses” put forward in 2005, she said, the MOE would focus 
its efforts on making information openness more systematized and improving its 
effectiveness. The central bureaucracy would employ strict discipline to end the 
entanglement of university recruitment with power and money. Wherever abuse or rule-
                                                
22 MOE, “Jiaoyubu guanyu zuohao 2006 nian quanguo putong gaodeng xuexiao zhaosheng luqu gongzuo 
de tongzhi” (MOE notice on carrying out regular higher education institutions’ 2006 recruiting and 
enrollment work). Jiaoxue 2006, no. 13. Items 3-5. 
23 Ibid.; see also Item 6 of the memo attached to “2006 nian putong gaodeng xuexiao zhaosheng gongzuo 
guiding” (Regular higher education institutions’ 2006 recruitment work guidelines). Jiaoxue 2006, no. 2 
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breaking occurred, disciplinary action would be severe, following the principle of 
“whoever is in charge is responsible” (shei zhuguan, shei fuze).24 
Lin further described how the Sunshine Project would make these goals possible, 
with the adoption of a nationwide online system for the real-time supervision and 
management of the entire recruiting and enrollment process. All planning, including 
score thresholds and the distribution of academic majors, would be carried out using only 
this system. By using this system to monitor every stage of college recruiting, the MOE 
would be able to close the loopholes that had fostered unauthorized enrollment and other 
illegal behavior. Lin also clarified that illegal enrollments included both students 
recruited from “outside the established structure” (tizhi wai)—i.e., via intermediary 
agents—as well as those who were “within the established structure but outside the plan” 
(tizhi nei, jihua wai). The ban on both types of enrollment expansion, she said, was 
“unambiguous and inflexible.”25 
By 2007, the MOE was calling the Sunshine Project “the basic foundation of the 
higher education enrollment process.” 26  The crackdown on intermediary recruiting 
agents, illegal fee-charging, and other forms of corruption continued, and high-ranking 
officials were directed to launch disciplinary investigations immediately if they 
uncovered information casting suspicion on any of their subordinates.27 Increasingly 
stringent standards were to be observed regarding data storage and security; CD backups 
were to be made regularly, stored in a separate location, and after their creation could not 
be tampered with for any reason. The MOE also forbade universities and all other 
                                                
24 “Jiaoyubu zhaokai fabuhui jieshao gaoxiao zhaosheng ‘Yangguang Gongcheng’ deng qingkuang” (MOE 
convenes news conference to explain the ‘Sunshine Project’ and other situations regarding higher education 
enrollment). PRC Central People’s Government Online Portal. June 26, 2006.  
25 Ibid. 
26 MOE, “Guanyu zuohao 2007 nian quanguo putong gaodeng xuexiao shaosheng luqu gongzuo de 
tongzhi” (MOE notice on carrying out regular higher education institutions’ 2007 recruiting and enrollment 
work). Jiaoxue 2007, no. 13. Item 1. 
27 Ibid., Item 5 
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bureaucratic levels from expanding enrollments without the direct, explicit agreement of 
the MOE itself—cutting out the provincial middleman, apparently for the first time.28 
The complete elimination of unplanned recruitment in 2007 demonstrates the 
effectiveness of these policies. 
In summary, the basic methods the MOE used to combat unauthorized 
expansion—responsibility, supervision, strict discipline—were hardly anything 
revolutionary. Indeed, firm language emphasizing tighter management and the threat of 
strict disciplinary measures was already in place by 2002, with little effect. The MOE 
was unable to gain control over runaway enrollment growth until it combined these 
traditional measures with a distinctly modern approach. When the Sunshine Project 
required the higher education bureaucracy to make policies, plans, and statistics all 
publicly available online, officials fell under much greater public scrutiny than they had 
been subject to in the past. Moreover, the Sunshine Project also introduced a highly 
effective internal monitoring mechanism by mandating the use of computer systems for 
all of the education bureaucracy’s record-keeping and daily operations.  
To some extent, it seems that these measures enabled the MOE to counteract its 
declining level of control over China’s higher education bureaucracy, as a central 
ministry in the context of fragmented authoritarianism. With this reassertion of its power, 
the MOE was able to achieve its long-standing goals of improving awareness and 
supervision at all levels, focusing on responsible leadership instead of merely hard 
targets, and imposing strict discipline for all forms of corruption and rule-bending. Most 
significantly, it was finally able to successfully rein in the rapid expansion of university 
enrollments that had been putting so much strain on resources. 
                                                
28 Ibid., Items 2-3 
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6.4—Closing Remarks 
In the past two decades, much scholarly attention has been devoted to the effects 
of state decentralization on politics, policy implementation, and central-local relations in 
China.29 The declining ability of the government in Beijing to manage the country’s 
massive state apparatus is a subject of much discussion and research. In this thesis, I 
applied the framework of fragmented authoritarianism to Chinese higher education 
policy. I found evidence that political incentives at local government levels distorted 
central policy in the higher education system, and furthermore, that these distortions 
played an even greater role in enrollment expansion than did central planning or market-
economy factors.  
My findings suggest that higher education expansion—arguably among China’s 
most influential national policies in recent memory—was, in a very real sense, an 
accident. If not for decentralization, rapid enrollment expansion would likely have been 
only a momentary occurrence, one small facet of the government’s comprehensive 
stimulus package guarding against the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s. Once the 
expansion policy was launched, however, the Ministry of Education had little power to 
stop or slow down its implementation at the local level. The soft budget constraints and 
short time horizons of Chinese university officials gave them a blank check to spend as 
much as necessary to carry out dramatic enrollment expansion, irrespective of the actual 
cost or damage of this policy. Enrollment growth and construction spending became 
effective means to a political end for local officials who were primarily concerned with 
their own career advancement.  
This realization about the true nature of university enrollment expansion compels 
a reevaluation of China’s supposed transition from “elite” to “mass” higher education. 
                                                
29 See Gong and Feng (1994), Lieberthal (1995), Howell (2006), Landry (2008), Birney (2014) 
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Elite universities, which were directly under the MOE’s control, were not affected by the 
problems plaguing lower-tier institutions as a result of fragmented state authority. When 
the MOE became concerned about enrollment expansion’s threat to education quality in 
2002, it was only these centrally-administered universities that heeded the call to slow 
down their growth. The divergence between upper-tier and lower-tier universities in 
terms of both enrollment size and education quality—in short, the emergence of the 
“pyramid” structure—can be directly attributed to the university system’s administrative 
decentralization and the resulting fragmented authoritarianism. In terms of gross 
enrollment rates, China may have achieved “mass higher education,” but in so doing, its 
universities have become more elitist than ever. 
How can China’s higher education system overcome the problems caused by 
rapid, uncontrolled enrollment expansion? Answering such a question would require a 
separate thesis. China has a multitude of poorly-funded, low-quality institutions caught in 
a ruinous cycle by the circumstances of fragmented authoritarianism. Lacking effective 
oversight, these schools are prone to mismanagement and abuse, further decreasing their 
quality and making it even more difficult for them to secure funding through student 
inflows or government support. This situation in turn forces them to raise tuition and take 
on debt. In the short term, the Ministry of Education could significantly improve the 
management of higher education simply by requiring longer terms of office for university 
administrators. If Chinese universities were run by educators instead of careerist 
bureaucrats, the excesses of rapid enrollment expansion would never have occurred in the 
first place. Making university administrators more responsible for their performance and 
behavior would certainly be a step in the right direction. 
More broadly speaking, how can China’s central government prevent abuse and 
predatory behavior at the local level? One potential solution lies in improving the central 
  75 
government’s monitoring capability by conducting official business on networked digital 
systems. The correspondence between the launch of the Sunshine Project and the 
immediate drop in unauthorized expansion indicates that this has been an effective tool. 
Similar methods employed on a much larger scale might also be used to counteract the 
fragmentation of authority and reassert central control over the national bureaucracy. The 
potential emergence of such a capability would be a significant development in the study 
of the Chinese state. To a Western observer, however, the prospect of a vast, internal 
monitoring system is uncomfortably Orwellian, hardly appealing even as a solution to the 
real problems caused by decentralization. 
Rather than attempting to make fragmented authoritarianism less fragmented, a 
more ideal approach would be to make it less authoritarian. As far as higher education 
policy is concerned, the only real long-term solution to the problems caused by 
decentralization is to remove Chinese universities’ soft budget constraint. Putting 
universities’ virtually unlimited borrowing ability under control would be beneficial from 
a financial standpoint, but such an effort would be about more than simply decreasing 
costs—it would require university administrators to develop a sense of responsibility for 
their actions. Chinese higher education institutions already have the autonomy to take on 
debt; therefore, they should also have the responsibility for that debt’s repayment. If 
universities had to compete in the open market to attract students, the higher education 
system would become more efficient and less prone to abuse without requiring the heavy 
hand of a central state. Rather than merely continuing decentralization, in which 
universities become more detached from the state while still remaining under its 
fragmented authority, the only effective solution is true institutional independence. 
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